BIAGGI v. FLYNN (2023)

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (William Franc Perry, J.), entered on or about September 9, 2022, which granted defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiff's amended complaint is time-barred insofar as it is directed toward defendant's alleged statements to New York City Human Resources Adult Protection Services (APS) and the Queens County District Attorney's Office (the DA's Office) in June and July 2019 (see Casa de Meadows Inc. (Cayman Is.) v. Zaman, 76 A.D.3d 917, 920, 908 N.Y.S.2d 628 [1st Dept. 2010] [“The statute of limitations for libel and slander ․ starts to run on the date of publication, so ‘the fact that the libel may not have been discovered until later matters not’ ”], quoting Fleischer v. Institute for Research in Hypnosis, 57 A.D.2d 535, 535, 394 N.Y.S.2d 1 [1st Dept. 1977]).  Plaintiff commenced this action more than one year after these statements were made (see CPLR 215[3];  Smulyan v. New York Liquidation Bur., 158 A.D.3d 456, 457, 71 N.Y.S.3d 412 [1st Dept. 2018]).  In addition, plaintiff's bare legal conclusion that the purported defamation continued into 2022 is insufficient to save his claims (see Mamoon v. Dot Net Inc., 135 A.D.3d 656, 658, 25 N.Y.S.3d 85 [1st Dept. 2016]).

As for his equitable estoppel argument, plaintiff failed to allege that defendant engaged in “subsequent and specific actions” that “somehow kept [him] from timely bringing suit” (Stroud Prods. & Enters., Inc. v. BMG Music, 123 A.D.3d 598, 999 N.Y.S.2d 60 [1st Dept. 2014] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).

In any event, even if plaintiff's claims were not time-barred, he has failed to state a claim for defamation, as the complaint does not allege the “exact words” complained of or the “time, place and manner of the alleged defamation” (see Offor v. Mercy Med. Ctr., 171 A.D.3d 502, 503, 98 N.Y.S.3d 69 [1st Dept. 2019]).