GILCHRIST v. OLVER (2023)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action pursuant to the Child Victims Act (see CPLR 208 [b]; 214-g) to recover for personal injuries resulting from alleged childhood sexual abuse perpetrated by defendant. Defendant moved, inter alia, to dismiss the complaint on the ground that this action is barred because plaintiff executed a general release arising out of a federal action commenced by plaintiff against defendant, which pertained to the same alleged childhood sexual abuse (see CPLR 3211 [a] [5]). Supreme Court granted defendant's motion insofar as it sought to dismiss the complaint, and plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

“Generally, a valid release constitutes a complete bar to an action on a claim which is the subject of the release” (Centro Empresarial Cempresa S.A. v. América Móvil, S.A.B. de C.V., 17 N.Y.3d 269, 276, 929 N.Y.S.2d 3, 952 N.E.2d 995 [2011] [internal quotation marks omitted]). A release will not be treated lightly because it is a “a jural act of high significance without which the settlement of disputes would be rendered all but impossible” (Mangini v. McClurg, 24 N.Y.2d 556, 563, 301 N.Y.S.2d 508, 249 N.E.2d 386 [1969]). Where the language is clear and unambiguous, the release is binding on the parties unless it is demonstrated to be invalid “for any of ‘the traditional bases for setting aside written agreements, namely, duress, illegality, fraud, or mutual mistake’ ” (Centro Empresarial Cempresa S.A., 17 N.Y.3d at 276, 929 N.Y.S.2d 3, 952 N.E.2d 995).

Here, defendant met his initial burden on the motion by submitting the binding general release executed by plaintiff (see Cain-Henry v. Shot, 194 A.D.3d 1465, 1466, 143 N.Y.S.3d 647 [4th Dept. 2021]; Ford v. Phillips, 121 A.D.3d 1232, 1233, 994 N.Y.S.2d 688 [3d Dept. 2014]). The burden thus shifted to plaintiff “ ‘to show that there has been fraud, duress or some other fact which will be sufficient to void the release’ ” (Centro Empresarial Cempresa S.A., 17 N.Y.3d at 276, 929 N.Y.S.2d 3, 952 N.E.2d 995). The conclusory allegations of duress contained in plaintiff's affidavit in opposition to the motion are insufficient to meet that burden (see Putnam v. Kibler, 210 A.D.3d 1458, 1462, 178 N.Y.S.3d 851 [4th Dept. 2022]; Hydrodyne Indus. v. Marine Midland Bank, 118 A.D.2d 626, 626, 499 N.Y.S.2d 777 [2d Dept. 1986]).