IN RE: Daniel R. SACK (2022)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously reversed on the law without costs, the motions are granted and the petition-complaint is dismissed.

Memorandum: Plaintiff-petitioner (plaintiff) commenced this hybrid CPLR article 78 proceeding and declaratory judgment action seeking, inter alia, a declaration that defendant-respondent City of Buffalo Common Council's designation of a certain Urban Development Action Area was illegal. Defendants-respondents (defendants) moved to dismiss the petition-complaint (complaint) on, inter alia, standing grounds. Supreme Court denied the motions, holding as relevant here that plaintiff had common-law taxpayer standing, but not traditional standing, to challenge the disputed designation. The court subsequently granted judgment in plaintiff's favor. Defendants appeal, and we now reverse.

Preliminarily, we note that a CPLR article 78 proceeding “is not the proper vehicle to test the validity of a legislative enactment” such as an Urban Development Action Area designation (Kamhi v. Town of Yorktown, 141 A.D.2d 607, 608, 529 N.Y.S.2d 528 [2d Dept. 1988], affd 74 N.Y.2d 423, 548 N.Y.S.2d 144, 547 N.E.2d 346 [1989]). Plaintiff's hybrid article 78 proceeding and declaratory judgment action is thus properly a declaratory judgment action alone (see Parker v. Town of Alexandria, 138 A.D.3d 1467, 1467-1468, 31 N.Y.S.3d 717 [4th Dept. 2016]; Centerville's Concerned Citizens v. Town Bd. of Town of Centerville, 56 A.D.3d 1129, 1129, 867 N.Y.S.2d 626 [4th Dept. 2008]).

On the merits, we agree with defendants that plaintiff lacks common-law taxpayer standing (see Matter of Colella v. Board of Assessors of County of Nassau, 95 N.Y.2d 401, 410-411, 718 N.Y.S.2d 268, 741 N.E.2d 113 [2000]; see generally Matter of Schulz v. State of New York, 81 N.Y.2d 336, 344-345, 599 N.Y.S.2d 469, 615 N.E.2d 953 [1993]; Matter of Urban League of Rochester, N.Y., Inc. v. County of Monroe, 49 N.Y.2d 551, 554, 427 N.Y.S.2d 593, 404 N.E.2d 715 [1980]; Boryszewski v. Brydges, 37 N.Y.2d 361, 362-364, 372 N.Y.S.2d 623, 334 N.E.2d 579 [1975]). Moreover, we reject plaintiff's contention—raised as an alternative ground for affirmance—that he has traditional standing (see Sloninski v. City of New York, 173 A.D.3d 801, 802, 104 N.Y.S.3d 634 [2d Dept. 2019]; Matter of Brighton Residents Against Violence to Children, Inc. v. MW Props., 304 A.D.2d 53, 57, 757 N.Y.S.2d 399 [4th Dept. 2003], lv denied 100 N.Y.2d 514, 769 N.Y.S.2d 200, 801 N.E.2d 421 [2003]; Matter of Unger v. Public Health Council, 215 A.D.2d 988, 989, 627 N.Y.S.2d 137 [3d Dept. 1995], lv denied 87 N.Y.2d 807, 641 N.Y.S.2d 598, 664 N.E.2d 509 [1996]; see generally Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. State of New York, 5 N.Y.3d 327, 352, 806 N.Y.S.2d 99, 840 N.E.2d 68 [2005]; Society of Plastics Indus. v. County of Suffolk, 77 N.Y.2d 761, 769-775, 570 N.Y.S.2d 778, 573 N.E.2d 1034 [1991]). Thus, because plaintiff has neither traditional standing nor common-law taxpayer standing to challenge the disputed designation, the court should have granted defendants’ motions to dismiss the complaint on that basis (see Colella, 95 N.Y.2d at 408, 718 N.Y.S.2d 268, 741 N.E.2d 113). Defendants’ remaining contentions are academic in light of our determination.