PEOPLE v. VERIGUETE (2021)

Judgment of conviction (Robert M. Mandelbaum, J.), rendered November 21, 2015, affirmed.

Since defendant did not waive prosecution by information, we assess the sufficiency of the accusatory instrument based on the standard applicable to an information (see People v Hatton, 26 NY3d 364, 368 [2015]). So viewed, the information charging reckless endangerment in the second degree (see Penal Law § 120.20) was jurisdictionally valid because it contained “nonconclusory factual allegations that, if assumed to be true, address[ed] each element of the crime charged, thereby affording reasonable cause to believe that defendant committed that offense” (People v Matthew P., 26 NY3d 332, 335-336 [2015] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Kalin, 12 NY3d 225, 228-229 [2009]).

The information recited that on November 20, 2015, at 11:45 p.m., a police officer responding to a radio run of a possible assault, observed defendant, who matched the description of the assault suspect. When the officer approached, defendant stated “you'll have to catch me first” and then “r[a]n across Second Avenue through four lanes of traffic,” causing “approximately three cars to stop abruptly to avoid hitting [him]”. As the officer chased defendant, “two cars stopped abruptly in order to avoid hitting [the officer].” Giving these allegations “a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading” (People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 360 [2000]), we find “as a matter of common sense and reasonable pleading” (People v Davis, 13 NY3d 17, 31 [2009]), that they were sufficient to support a finding that defendant acted recklessly, and that his actions “create[d] a substantial risk of serious physical injury to another person” (Penal Law § 120.20), as well as creating the risk of automobile accidents (see Matter of Carlil M., 116 AD3d 543 [2014]; Matter of William H., 264 AD2d 676 [1999]).

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.

Per Curiam.

All concur.