CHAPMAN v. JACOBS (2021)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action seeking damages for, inter alia, fraud arising from his purchase of a home from defendants, alleging that defendants represented that there was a certificate of occupancy for a pole barn situated on the property when, in fact, the Town of Farmington (Town) voided the certificate of occupancy when it discovered that the barn encroached on the adjoining property. Although the record establishes that plaintiff was aware of the encroachment prior to closing, plaintiff alleged that he was unaware that the Town had voided the certificate of occupancy and believed that any issue regarding the barn had been resolved through a boundary line agreement between defendants and the adjoining landowner. After plaintiff purchased the home, however, the Town informed him that he would have to relocate or remove the barn, and this action ensued. Plaintiff now appeals from an order that granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's cause of action for fraud. We affirm.

“New York adheres to the doctrine of caveat emptor and imposes no liability on a seller for failing to disclose information regarding the premises when the parties deal at arm's length, unless there is some conduct on the part of the seller which constitutes active concealment” (Simone v. Homecheck Real Estate Servs., Inc., 42 A.D.3d 518, 520, 840 N.Y.S.2d 398 [2d Dept. 2007]; see Jablonski v. Rapalje, 14 A.D.3d 484, 485, 788 N.Y.S.2d 158 [2d Dept. 2005]). “False representation in a property condition disclosure statement mandated by Real Property Law § 462 (2) may constitute active concealment in the context of fraudulent nondisclosure ․, [but] to maintain such a cause of action, the buyer must show, in effect, that the seller thwarted the buyer's efforts to fulfill the buyer's responsibilities fixed by the doctrine of caveat emptor” (Mikulski v. Battaglia, 112 A.D.3d 1355, 1356-1357, 977 N.Y.S.2d 839 [4th Dept. 2013] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Gallagher v. Ruzzine, 147 A.D.3d 1456, 1458, 46 N.Y.S.3d 323 [4th Dept. 2017], lv denied 29 N.Y.3d 919, 2017 WL 4051611 [2017]; Sample v. Yokel, 94 A.D.3d 1413, 1415, 943 N.Y.S.2d 694 [4th Dept. 2012]). Here, even assuming, arguendo, that defendants’ alleged representations in the property condition disclosure statement constituted active concealment, we conclude that defendants met their initial burden on the motion by establishing that those representations did not “thwart[ ]” plaintiff's ability to conduct his own investigation into the property (Mikulski, 112 A.D.3d at 1357, 977 N.Y.S.2d 839) inasmuch as the status of the certificate of occupancy “was readily ascertainable from the public record” (Matos v. Crimmins, 40 A.D.3d 1053, 1055, 837 N.Y.S.2d 234 [2d Dept. 2007]). Plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition (see id.). Further, an action for fraud requires, inter alia, “justifiable reliance by the plaintiff” (Morrow v. MetLife Invs. Ins. Co. [appeal No. 2], 177 A.D.3d 1288, 1289, 113 N.Y.S.3d 421 [4th Dept. 2019]). Here, defendants met their initial burden of establishing the absence of justifiable reliance on defendants’ alleged representations by submitting evidence that plaintiff was aware, prior to closing, that the barn encroached on the adjoining property (see generally Gallagher, 147 A.D.3d at 1459, 46 N.Y.S.3d 323). Plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition (see generally Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557, 562, 427 N.Y.S.2d 595, 404 N.E.2d 718 [1980]).