PEOPLE v. RANGEL (2021)

Judgment of conviction (Ann E. Scherzer, J.), rendered December 8, 2016, affirmed.

Our review of the record indicates that defendant's guilty plea was knowing, intelligent and voluntary. Defendant pleaded guilty to driving while ability impaired by alcohol (see Vehicle and Traffic Law [VTL] § 1192[1]), a traffic infraction, in exchange for a sentence of a 90-day licence suspension, a conditional discharge and fine. The plea occurred more than one year after defendant had been arrested and charged, and she had counsel on the case, who had successfully moved for a speedy trial dismissal of the more serious charges, including aggravated driving while intoxicated (see VTL § 1192[2-a]), a misdemeanor carrying a maximum sentence of one year in jail (see VTL § 1193[1][b]). Upon questioning by the Court, defendant admitted to driving while her ability to do so was impaired by the use of alcohol, confirmed that she was pleading guilty voluntarily and that she understood she was giving up her right to trial, the right to remain silent and the right to have the prosecutor prove her guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the record as a whole establishes defendant's understanding and waiver of her constitutional rights, despite the absence of a full enumeration of all the rights waived (see People v Sougou, 26 NY3d 1052, 1054 [2015]; People v Simmons, 138 AD3d 520 [2016], lv denied 27 NY3d 1139 [2016]).

In any event, the only relief defendant requests is dismissal of the accusatory instrument rather than vacatur of the plea, and she expressly requests this Court to affirm the conviction if it does not grant a dismissal. Because we do not find that dismissal would be appropriate, we affirm on this basis as well (see e.g. People v Teron, 139 AD3d 450 [2016]).

Per Curiam.

All concur.