PEOPLE v. STANLEY (2021)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously reversed on the law, the plea is vacated, and the matter is remitted to Supreme Court, Monroe County, for further proceedings on the indictment.

Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon a plea of guilty of robbery in the second degree (Penal Law § 160.10 [1]), defendant contends that his plea should be vacated because Supreme Court failed to advise him of the consequences of violating the plea agreement and, in the alternative, that this Court should exercise its interest of justice jurisdiction to adjudicate him a youthful offender and reduce the sentence. We agree with defendant that his plea should be vacated.

Pursuant to the plea agreement, defendant entered his plea in exchange for a promise of youthful offender adjudication and a sentence of probation. Following the entry of the plea, the court informed defendant that, if he violated the terms of the plea agreement, the court would “not keep the promise [it] made regarding [his] sentence” and that it could “impose a much more significant or higher sentence.” The court did not specify what that higher sentence could entail, nor did it mention the possibility of postrelease supervision (PRS).

Prior to sentencing, defendant violated the terms of the plea agreement when he failed to cooperate with the probation department and was arrested on new felony charges. The court held a hearing pursuant to People v. Outley, 80 N.Y.2d 702, 594 N.Y.S.2d 683, 610 N.E.2d 356 [1993] and determined that there was a valid basis on which to enhance the sentence. The prosecutor then requested that the court sentence defendant as an adult and impose a sentence of 15 years of incarceration with five years of PRS. The court imposed a determinate sentence of 71/212 years of incarceration plus five years of PRS.

The court was required “to advise defendant that his enhanced sentence would include PRS, and was also required to specify the length of the term of PRS to be imposed” (People v. Singletary, 118 A.D.3d 610, 611, 987 N.Y.S.2d 843 [1st Dept. 2014], citing People v. McAlpin, 17 N.Y.3d 936, 938, 936 N.Y.S.2d 666, 960 N.E.2d 435 [2011]; see People v. Chander, 113 A.D.3d 697, 698-699, 978 N.Y.S.2d 331 [2d Dept. 2014]). Although defendant did not object to the imposition of PRS or move to withdraw his plea or to vacate the judgment of conviction, this case falls under an exception to the preservation rule inasmuch as “[t]he prosecutor's mention of PRS immediately before sentencing was not the type of notice under People v. Murray, 15 N.Y.3d 725, 906 N.Y.S.2d 521, 932 N.E.2d 877 [2010] that would require defendant to preserve the issue” (Singletary, 118 A.D.3d at 611, 987 N.Y.S.2d 843; see McAlpin, 17 N.Y.3d at 938, 936 N.Y.S.2d 666, 960 N.E.2d 435; cf. People v. Donald, 132 A.D.3d 1396, 1397, 17 N.Y.S.3d 574 [4th Dept. 2015], lv denied 26 N.Y.3d 1144, 32 N.Y.S.3d 58, 51 N.E.3d 569 [2016]; see generally People v. Williams, 27 N.Y.3d 212, 214, 51 N.E.3d 528 [2016]). We therefore conclude that defendant's plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered and that vacatur of the plea is required (see McAlpin, 17 N.Y.3d at 937-938, 936 N.Y.S.2d 666, 960 N.E.2d 435).

In light of our determination, defendant's remaining contentions are academic.