PEOPLE v. SYKES (2021)

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Anthony J. Ferrara, J.), rendered April 13, 2016, convicting defendant, after a nonjury trial, of promoting prostitution in the third degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, and sentencing him to concurrent terms of 2 to 6 years, unanimously affirmed.

The court properly denied defendant's suppression motion. Exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry into defendant's home (see generally People v. McBride, 14 N.Y.3d 440, 446, 902 N.Y.S.2d 830, 928 N.E.2d 1027 [2010], cert denied 562 U.S. 931, 131 S.Ct. 327, 178 L.Ed.2d 212 [2010]). The victim's statements to the police, while pointing to defendant's nearby house, provided “probable cause to arrest him” for the “violent crime[s]” of raping her and holding her against her will for days, and gave police “strong reason to believe that defendant was inside his” home (id.; see e.g. People v. Green, 104 A.D.3d 126, 131–32, 958 N.Y.S.2d 138 [1st Dept. 2013]). Defendant was also “reasonably believed to be armed” (McBride, 14 N.Y.3d at 446, 902 N.Y.S.2d 830, 928 N.E.2d 1027), because the victim told the police that defendant kept a handgun under his pillow (see e.g. People v. Funches, 89 N.Y.2d 1005, 1007, 657 N.Y.S.2d 396, 679 N.E.2d 635 [1997]). Under the particular circumstances of this case, it is not dispositive whether defendant posed a flight risk (see People v. Hallman, 237 A.D.2d 17, 22–23, 667 N.Y.S.2d 23 [1st Dept. 1997], affd 92 N.Y.2d 840, 677 N.Y.S.2d 64, 699 N.E.2d 423 [1998]).

The trial court providently exercised its discretion in admitting prostitution advertisements bearing telephone and email addresses associated with defendant and the codefendants, posted during the months preceding the time period set forth in the indictment. These ads were not evidence of uncharged crimes, but instead were relevant to prove elements of the charged crime of third-degree promoting prostitution, because they “established the existence of a prostitution business” that defendant “continued to manage or supervise into the period covered by the indictment” (People v. Gomez, 183 A.D.3d 544, 545, 124 N.Y.S.3d 30 [1st Dept. 2020], lv denied 35 N.Y.3d 1045, 127 N.Y.S.3d 859, 151 N.E.3d 540 [2020]). Alternatively, “even if viewed as uncharged crime evidence,” the ads “were also highly probative to show a common scheme or plan, and their probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect” (id. [internal citations omitted]), particularly in this nonjury trial.

Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims are unreviewable on direct appeal because they involve matters not fully explained by the record (see People v. Maffei, 35 N.Y.3d 264, 269–70, 127 N.Y.S.3d 403, 150 N.E.3d 1169 [2020]). Accordingly, because defendant has not made a CPL 440.10 motion, the merits of the ineffectiveness claims may not be addressed on appeal. In the alternative, to the extent the existing record permits review, we find that defendant received effective assistance under the state and federal standards (see People v. Benevento, 91 N.Y.2d 708, 713–714, 674 N.Y.S.2d 629, 697 N.E.2d 584 [1998]; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 [1984]).