HARRINGTON v. 77 NY 46 LLC (2020)

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Louis L. Nock, J.), entered March 6, 2020, which denied defendants 77 NY@ 46 St., LLC and Management by 77, LLC's (together, 77 NY) motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and cross claims against them, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, and the motion granted.  The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

Plaintiff was injured when he fell through open cellar doors in the sidewalk in front of premises owned and managed by 77 NY. It is undisputed that an employee of defendant Azogues Corp., the first-floor tenant, had opened the cellar doors from the basement in violation of the usual procedure of opening the doors from the sidewalk to ensure the safety of pedestrians.  Indeed, plaintiff did not oppose 77 NY's motion with respect to the dismissal of the complaint as against it, and the motion should be granted on that ground.

For similar reasons, the cross claims against 77 N.Y. should also be dismissed because the record demonstrates that the sole proximate cause of the accident was Azogues' employee's conduct (see Rivera v. City of New York, 11 N.Y.2d 856, 857, 227 N.Y.S.2d 676, 182 N.E.2d 284 [1962];  Dillard v. New York City Hous. Auth., 112 A.D.3d 504, 505, 977 N.Y.S.2d 226 [1st Dept. 2013];  see e.g. Baez v. Barnard Coll., 71 A.D.3d 585, 586, 898 N.Y.S.2d 29 [1st Dept. 2010];  Almanzar v. Picasso's Clothing, 281 A.D.2d 341, 723 N.Y.S.2d 11 [1st Dept. 2001]).  Contrary to Azogues' contentions, liability may not be imposed on 77 N.Y. based on a failure to provide safeguards to prevent injury, such as warning lights or signals (see e.g. Brown v. Weinreb, 183 A.D.2d 562, 563, 583 N.Y.S.2d 460 [1st Dept. 1992]).  Nor is Administrative Code § 7–210 is applicable, because there is no evidence that the condition of the sidewalk was a proximate cause of the accident.