DECONGELIO v. 1177 (2020)

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Barbara Jaffe, J.), entered February 25, 2019, which granted defendants-respondents' motions for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as against them, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Defendants made a prima facie showing that they took reasonable measures to prevent a slippery condition from developing due to moisture tracked into their building on the snowy and rainy day of plaintiff's slip and fall in the lobby (see O'Sullivan v. 7–Eleven, Inc., 151 A.D.3d 658, 54 N.Y.S.3d 582 [1st Dept. 2017];  see also Kelly v. Roza 14W LLC, 153 A.D.3d 1187, 1188, 62 N.Y.S.3d 49 [1st Dept. 2017]).  They submitted evidence that the entire lobby floor between two entrances and the security gates was covered by 80 to 100 feet of thick mats to absorb wetness tracked in by pedestrian traffic, that plaintiff did not observe water on the floor between the security gates and the elevators when she entered the building, that the on-site manager inspected the entire lobby and elevator bank about an hour before plaintiff slipped and did not observe a wet and slippery condition, and that porters in the lobby were assigned to inspect the lobby regularly and mop up water from the floor.

Plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact as to whether defendants had constructive notice of a dangerously wet floor, since she submitted no evidence of how long the condition had existed before she slipped (see Garcia v. Delgado Travel Agency, 4 A.D.3d 204, 204, 771 N.Y.S.2d 646 [1st Dept. 2004]).  The affidavit by defendant ABM Janitorial Services' former employee, to the extent it may properly be considered (see Ravagnan v. One Ninety Realty Co., 64 A.D.3d 481, 482, 883 N.Y.S.2d 490 [1st Dept. 2009]), fails to demonstrate that defendants routinely left unaddressed an ongoing and recurring dangerous condition in the area of the accident (see Irizarry v. 15 Mosholu Four, LLC, 24 A.D.3d 373, 373, 806 N.Y.S.2d 534 [1st Dept. 2005]).  The affidavit by plaintiff's proffered expert only described general conditions on rainy days in other areas of the lobby, did not mention the date of plaintiff's accident, and otherwise corroborated defendants' evidence that they followed a “reasonable cleaning routine” on days when the weather was inclement (Kelly, 153 A.D.3d at 1188, 62 N.Y.S.3d 49).  “[A] ‘general awareness’ that a dangerous condition may be present is legally insufficient to constitute notice of the particular condition that caused plaintiff's fall” (Piacquadio v. Recine Realty Corp., 84 N.Y.2d 967, 969, 622 N.Y.S.2d 493, 646 N.E.2d 795 [1994];  see also Keum Choi v. Olympia & York Water St. Co., 278 A.D.2d 106, 107, 718 N.Y.S.2d 42 [1st Dept. 2000]).

Plaintiff's expert affidavit failed to raise an issue of fact because it is speculative;  the expert never examined the lobby floor but only reviewed photographs and testimony, “from which it would be impossible to conclude how slippery the floor was” (Kalish v. HEI Hospitality, LLC, 114 A.D.3d 444, 446, 980 N.Y.S.2d 80 [1st Dept. 2014];  see also Tarrabocchia v. 245 Park Ave. Co., 285 A.D.2d 388, 389, 728 N.Y.S.2d 451 [1st Dept. 2001]).

We have considered plaintiff's remaining contentions and find them unavailing.