PEOPLE v. RODRIGUEZ (2020)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of, inter alia, two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree (Penal Law § 265.01[4]), defendant argues that County Court erred in refusing to suppress physical evidence on Payton grounds. We affirm.

“The evil to which the [Payton] rule is addressed is the unsupervised invasion of a citizen's privacy in his [or her] own home” (People v. Minley, 68 N.Y.2d 952, 953, 510 N.Y.S.2d 87, 502 N.E.2d 1002 [1986]). Thus, Payton is not violated when a warrantless arrest occurs “in the threshold of a residence ․, provided that the suspect has voluntarily answered the door and the police have not crossed the threshold” (People v. Garvin, 30 N.Y.3d 174, 177, 66 N.Y.S.3d 161, 88 N.E.3d 319 [2017], cert denied ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 57, 202 L.Ed.2d 20 [2018]; see People v. Reynoso, 2 N.Y.3d 820, 821, 781 N.Y.S.2d 284, 814 N.E.2d 456 [2004]). Here, the record supports the suppression court's determination that defendant was arrested at the threshold of his apartment after having voluntarily answered the door and that the police did not cross into defendant's home in order to effectuate the arrest. Thus, defendant was not arrested without a warrant in violation of the Payton rule (see Reynoso, 2 N.Y.3d at 821, 781 N.Y.S.2d 284, 814 N.E.2d 456; People v. Evans, 132 A.D.3d 1398, 1399, 17 N.Y.S.3d 576 [4th Dept. 2015], lv denied 26 N.Y.3d 1087, 23 N.Y.S.3d 644, 44 N.E.3d 942 [2015]; People v. Schiavo, 212 A.D.2d 816, 816, 623 N.Y.S.2d 273 [2d Dept. 1995], lv denied 85 N.Y.2d 942, 627 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 651 N.E.2d 929 [1995]).

Contrary to defendant's contention, the fact that the police immediately “pushed or guided” him three feet inside the apartment after he was arrested in order to search him does not establish that the arrest itself occurred inside the house in violation of the Payton rule (see People v. Correa, 55 A.D.3d 1380, 1380, 864 N.Y.S.2d 643 [4th Dept. 2008], lv denied 11 N.Y.3d 924, 874 N.Y.S.2d 9, 902 N.E.2d 443 [2009]; see also People v. Rosario, 179 A.D.2d 442, 442, 579 N.Y.S.2d 12 [1st Dept. 1992], lv denied 79 N.Y.2d 1053, 584 N.Y.S.2d 1021, 596 N.E.2d 419 [1992]). “The location of [the] arrest is dispositive of [a Payton] claim” (People v. Pearson, 82 A.D.3d 475, 475, 918 N.Y.S.2d 409 [1st Dept. 2011], lv denied 17 N.Y.3d 809, 929 N.Y.S.2d 568, 953 N.E.2d 806 [2011]), and as noted above, the court properly found that defendant was arrested, i.e., subjected to “a significant interruption of [his] liberty of movement as a result of police action” (People v. Brown, 142 A.D.3d 1373, 1375, 38 N.Y.S.3d 862 [4th Dept. 2016], lv denied 28 N.Y.3d 1123, 51 N.Y.S.3d 20, 73 N.E.3d 360 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted] ), at the threshold of his apartment. Contrary to defendant's further contention, the officer's incorrect belief that an arrest is complete only after the suspect is searched incident to arrest is irrelevant to the objective legality of the officer's conduct (see generally Garvin, 30 N.Y.3d at 186, 66 N.Y.S.3d 161, 88 N.E.3d 319).

The officer's subsequent entry into defendant's bedroom occurred only because defendant asked the officer to retrieve his wallet and keys from that bedroom, and the contraband was in plain view in that room. Thus, defendant's motion to suppress such contraband was properly denied (see People v. Burke, 24 A.D.3d 129, 130, 805 N.Y.S.2d 311 [1st Dept. 2005], lv denied 6 N.Y.3d 846, 816 N.Y.S.2d 752, 849 N.E.2d 975 [2006]).