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Thomas CARCIONE, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. ESSEX HOMES OF WNY, INC., Essex Homes, Inc., Defendants–Respondents, et al., Defendant.
Essex Homes of WNY, Inc., and Essex Homes, Inc., Third–Party Plaintiffs–Respondents, v. R.M. Wick, Inc., Third–Party Defendant–Respondent. The Hartford Insurance Company, Nonparty Appellant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously reversed on the law without costs and the motion is denied.
Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action seeking damages for an injury he sustained in a work-related accident on November 4, 2008. As a result of that injury, nonparty The Hartford Insurance Company (Hartford), the workers' compensation insurer for plaintiff's employer, paid benefits to plaintiff and claimed a lien in the amount of those payments (see Workers' Compensation Law § 29). Plaintiff moved for an order reducing the lien, and Supreme Court, in effect, granted the motion. Although it was undisputed that plaintiff had filed only one workers' compensation claim, which stemmed from the November 4, 2008 injury, and thus that Hartford had provided workers' compensation benefits solely pursuant to that claim, the court nevertheless determined that a majority of those benefits payments related to injuries plaintiff purportedly sustained after November 4, 2008, for which plaintiff had not submitted workers' compensation claims. The court therefore reduced Hartford's lien to the amount of benefits that the court determined were paid by Hartford with respect to plaintiff's November 4, 2008 injury. Hartford appeals, and we reverse.
Workers' Compensation Law § 29(1) provides as relevant here that, if an employee has received workers' compensation benefits, the insurance carrier liable for the payment of those benefits “shall have a lien on the proceeds of any recovery from [another], whether by judgment, settlement or otherwise, after the deduction of the reasonable and necessary expenditures, including attorney's fees, incurred in effecting such recovery, to the extent of the total amount of compensation awarded under or provided or estimated ․ for such case and the expenses for medical treatment paid or to be paid by it and to such extent such recovery shall be deemed for the benefit of” the insurance carrier. “ ‘[S]ection 29, read in its entirety and in context, clearly reveals a legislative design to provide for reimbursement of the compensation carrier whenever a recovery is obtained in tort for the same injury that was a predicate for the payment of compensation benefits’ ” (Matter of Beth V. v. New York State Off. of Children & Family Servs., 22 N.Y.3d 80, 91, 980 N.Y.S.2d 47, 3 N.E.3d 113 [2013]; see Ronkese v. Tilcon N.Y., Inc., 129 A.D.3d 1273, 1275, 11 N.Y.S.3d 717 [3d Dept. 2015], lv dismissed 28 N.Y.3d 1045, 43 N.Y.S.3d 244, 65 N.E.3d 1279 [2016], lv dismissed 30 N.Y.3d 1049, 69 N.Y.S.3d 577, 92 N.E.3d 800 [2018]; see generally Spadaro v. Meza, 100 A.D.3d 736, 738, 953 N.Y.S.2d 667 [2d Dept. 2012]). Here, as noted, it is undisputed that Hartford made payments to plaintiff solely with respect to his workers' compensation claim for the November 4, 2008 injury, and indeed that plaintiff filed no other workers' compensation claim for which benefits were paid. Once Hartford provided payments to plaintiff predicated on his claim for the November 4, 2008 injury, Hartford obtained a lien in the amount of those payments against any recovery by plaintiff in his tort action arising from that same injury (see Beth V., 22 N.Y.3d at 91, 980 N.Y.S.2d 47, 3 N.E.3d 113). After Hartford obtained such lien by virtue of its payments to plaintiff, “[t]he court was without authority to ․ strike, waive or reduce any portion of ․ Hartford's lien, beyond its share of the litigation expenses, including attorney's fees, so that plaintiff could recover more” (Fernandez v. Toyota Lease Trust, 156 A.D.3d 435, 435, 64 N.Y.S.3d 553 [1st Dept. 2017]; see also Hammer v. Turner Constr. Corp., 39 A.D.3d 705, 705, 833 N.Y.S.2d 633 [2d Dept. 2007]).
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Docket No: 1227
Decided: January 31, 2020
Court: Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.
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Get help with your legal needs
FindLaw’s Learn About the Law features thousands of informational articles to help you understand your options. And if you’re ready to hire an attorney, find one in your area who can help.
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