DIPIETRO v. VATSKY (2019)

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Douglas E. Hoffman, J.), entered December 3, 2018, which, inter alia, granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment dismissing defendant's affirmative defenses and counterclaims and for a declaration that the parties' prenuptial agreement and its amendments are valid and enforceable, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Defendant husband's efforts to meet his “very high burden” for challenging the parties' prenuptial agreement fail (Anonymous v. Anonymous, 123 A.D.3d 581, 582, 999 N.Y.S.2d 386 [1st Dept. 2014]). The parties, both educated and savvy professionals with significant assets of their own, were each represented by independent counsel, and entered into the prenuptial agreement after a period of negotiations several months before the marriage.

Contrary to defendant's contention, the record demonstrates that plaintiff adequately disclosed her finances. In fact, prior to executing the prenuptial agreement, the parties met with defendant's financial advisor to discuss their financial future together. In any event, plaintiff's alleged failure to disclose does not provide a ground to set aside the prenuptial agreement (see Gottlieb v. Gottlieb, 138 A.D.3d 30, 38–39, 25 N.Y.S.3d 90 [1st Dept. 2016], lv dismissed 27 N.Y.3d 1125, 36 N.Y.S.3d 880, 57 N.E.3d 73 [2016]; Strong v. Dubin, 48 A.D.3d 232, 233, 851 N.Y.S.2d 428 [1st Dept. 2008]), particularly, here, where defendant proceeded to execute the prenuptial agreement despite his claim that plaintiff refused to supply him with financial documents (see Matter of Fizzinoglia, 26 N.Y.3d 1031, 1032, 22 N.Y.S.3d 151, 43 N.E.3d 361 [2015]).

We also agree with the motion court that the prenuptial agreement and its amendments were not the product of overreaching. The prenuptial agreement, which included joint waivers of maintenance, the right to equitable distribution, and the right to election, was not so “manifestly unfair” as to warrant equity's intervention (see Gottlieb, at 41–42, 25 N.Y.S.3d 90). Although the transfer of defendant's house to plaintiff may not have been in his best financial interest, defendant's attorney made his objection to this provision abundantly clear. Defendant proceeded to execute the prenuptial agreement over his attorney's objection. Thus, even if, in retrospect, this specific provision was improvident or one-sided, it does not provide a ground to vitiate the prenuptial agreement (Christian v. Christian, 42 N.Y.2d 63, 72–73, 396 N.Y.S.2d 817, 365 N.E.2d 849 [1977]; Barocas v. Barocas, 94 A.D.3d 551, 551, 942 N.Y.S.2d 491 [1st Dept. 2012], appeal dismissed 19 N.Y.3d 993, 951 N.Y.S.2d 468, 975 N.E.2d 914 [2012]). Defendant's efforts to establish that the agreement was the product of duress are not persuasive (see Cohen v. Cohen, 93 A.D.3d 506, 940 N.Y.S.2d 250 [1st Dept. 2012], lv denied 24 N.Y.3d 909, 2014 WL 6475220 [2014]).

We have considered defendant's remaining contentions and find them unavailing.