PEOPLE v. LOPEZ (2019)

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (James M. Burke, J.), rendered July 11, 2017, convicting defendant, after a nonjury trial, of criminal trespass in the second degree, and sentencing him to a term of one year, unanimously affirmed.

Defendant's legal sufficiency claim is unpreserved, and we decline to review it in the interest of justice. As an alternative holding, we reject it on the merits. We also find that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 348–349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 [2007]). Although defendant asserts that the People's case was based entirely on hearsay, that is, grand jury minutes, those minutes were received in evidence by stipulation. The evidence established defendant made a knowingly unlawful entry into the victims' apartment, by means of force and threats of violence.

Defendant did not preserve his claim that the court erred in failing to announce that it would be considering the lesser included offense of second-degree trespass (see People v. Jackson, 166 A.D.2d 356, 561 N.Y.S.2d 22 [1st Dept. 1990], lv denied 77 N.Y.2d 839, 567 N.Y.S.2d 208, 568 N.E.2d 657 [1991]), and we decline to review it in the interest of justice. As an alternative holding, we find that defendant was not prejudiced in any way.

Defendant's challenge to the validity of his duly executed, open-court jury waiver is likewise unpreserved (see People v. Johnson, 51 N.Y.2d 986, 987, 435 N.Y.S.2d 713, 416 N.E.2d 1048 [1980]), and we decline to review it in the interest of justice. As an alternative holding, we find that defendant made a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver after an extensive and appropriate colloquy (see People v. Smith, 6 N.Y.3d 827, 828, 817 N.Y.S.2d 575, 850 N.E.2d 622 [2006], cert. denied 548 U.S. 905, 126 S.Ct. 2971, 165 L.Ed.2d 953 [2006]). Defendant asserts that because the only evidence consisted of grand jury minutes received by stipulation, and because there were no opening statements or summations, his trial was “bizarre” and “unrecognizable,” so that these unusual features should have been addressed by the court in its jury waiver colloquy. However, this type of trial was permissible (see People v. Williams, 161 A.D.2d 295, 555 N.Y.S.2d 69 [1st Dept. 1990]), and it did not require the court to make a special inquiry of defendant (see People v. Mills, 103 A.D.2d 379, 480 N.Y.S.2d 493 [2d Dept. 1984]).

Finally, we note that, according to defendant, a fair reading of the record is that the court and parties had agreed in advance of the nonjury trial that a misdemeanor conviction would be appropriate. Even assuming that to be the case, there is every indication that defendant, a second felony offender ineligible for a misdemeanor plea, welcomed the opportunity to obtain a misdemeanor conviction by way of this abbreviated trial.