IN RE: Ann C. MCCORMACK BY Her Special Guardian and Attorney-in-Fact Carol BAMONTE (2019)

Petitioner failed to demonstrate that Surrogate Anderson improvidently exercised her discretion in refusing to recuse herself (see Wong v. 2669 Owners Ltd., 126 A.D.3d 451, 2 N.Y.S.3d 356 [1st Dept. 2015] ).  As the Surrogate found, 22 NYCRR 151.1 does not require her recusal based on contributions made by the GAL's wife or law firm to the Surrogate's 2008 campaign.  Moreover, there is no evidence that the contributions played any role in her determinations.  There is also no evidence that, at the time the GAL was appointed, the Surrogate was aware of the relationship between his firm and the firm of one of respondent's attorneys, Steven I. Holm. In any event, the relationship was too attenuated to demonstrate that the GAL breached his fiduciary duty to Kathleen Durst in connection with the preparation of his report or recommendation regarding the date of her death.

On the current record, we cannot determine whether the amount of the fee the Surrogate awarded to the GAL was “reasonable compensation” (SCPA 405[1] ).  The Surrogate has the sole discretion to award the GAL “reasonable compensation for his services” (Matter of Burk, 6 A.D.2d 429, 430, 179 N.Y.S.2d 25 [1st Dept. 1958] ).  This determination is governed by several criteria, including “the nature and extent of the services, the actual time spent, the necessity therefor, the nature of the issues involved, the professional standing of counsel, and the results achieved” (id.).  The Surrogate “must provide a concise but clear explanation of [her] reasons for the fee award, or lack thereof” (Matter of Moriarty, 119 A.D.3d 445, 445, 988 N.Y.S.2d 496 [1st Dept. 2014] [internal quotation marks omitted];  see also Matter of Hultay [Ronald P.S.], 136 A.D.3d 572, 573, 26 N.Y.S.3d 264 [1st Dept. 2016] [holding that “proper appellate review” cannot take place if the court “failed to give a reason” for its fee award] ).

Here, the Surrogate failed to provide her reasoning for the amount of the fee she awarded to the GAL. As a result, there is an insufficient record for appellate review.  Accordingly, the matter is remanded to the Surrogate for a “concise but clear” explanation of her reasons for the amount of the fee award.  The Surrogate's explanation should discuss the factors she considered when determining the amount that she awarded to the GAL.

Finally, without a showing of “good cause,” or indeed a discussion of the issue (see SCPA 405[1] ), the Surrogate improperly directed that the GAL's fee be paid by petitioner's personal representative, rather than by the Estate of Kathleen Durst, which benefitted from the appointment.  The appointment of the GAL did not result from any conduct of petitioner or her personal representative.