IN RE: Maria MATHEW (2019)

Although petitioner challenges the calculation of some of her ratings, there is no basis for finding that the termination of her probationary employment “was for a constitutionally impermissible purpose, violative of a statute, or done in badfaith” (Matter of Mendez v. New York City Dept. of Educ., 28 N.Y.3d 993, 994, 41 N.Y.S.3d 208, 63 N.E.3d 1152 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Brown v. City of New York, 280 A.D.2d 368, 370, 721 N.Y.S.2d 497 [1st Dept. 2001] ).  The evidence that petitioner received two “developing” annual overall ratings supports the conclusion that the determination was not made in bad faith, even though she received an “effective” rating in her last year (see Matter of Leka v. New York City Law Dept., 160 A.D.3d 497, 76 N.Y.S.3d 7 [1st Dept. 2018]; Matter of York v. McGuire, 99 A.D.2d 1023, 473 N.Y.S.2d 815 [1st Dept. 1984], affd 63 N.Y.2d 760, 480 N.Y.S.2d 320, 469 N.E.2d 838 [1984] ).  Nor was petitioner entitled to notice of the possibility that her probationary employment would be terminated, beyond the required 60–day notice that was given (Education Law § 2573[1] ).  Furthermore, any deviations from certain procedures did not deprive petitioner of a substantial right or undermine the fairness and integrity of the rating process (see Cooper v. City of New York, 158 A.D.3d 553, 554, 68 N.Y.S.3d 876 [1st Dept. 2018] ).

We have considered petitioner's remaining arguments and find them unavailing.