STUBER v. STUBER (2022)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously reversed on the law without costs, the motion is granted, and the complaint is dismissed without prejudice.

Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action seeking to set aside a property settlement agreement (agreement), which was incorporated but not merged into the parties’ judgment of divorce, on grounds of fraud, undue influence, unconscionability, and duress. Defendant appeals from an order that, inter alia, denied his motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1), (5), and (7). We reverse.

A movant contending that a pleading fails to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) may submit affidavits and evidence to demonstrate conclusively that the plaintiff does not have a cause of action (see Liberty Affordable Hous., Inc. v. Maple Ct. Apts., 125 A.D.3d 85, 88-90, 998 N.Y.S.2d 543 [4th Dept. 2015]). Here, plaintiff's vague allegations that defendant failed to make full financial disclosure when the agreement was entered into are belied by the evidence produced in defendant's motion papers. Thus, we conclude that the agreement, together with the evidence submitted by defendant, “flatly contradict[s]” plaintiff's allegations that she was not provided with complete disclosure regarding the subject assets at the time she executed the agreement (Simkin v. Blank, 19 N.Y.3d 46, 52, 945 N.Y.S.2d 222, 968 N.E.2d 459 [2012]; see Liberty Affordable Hous., Inc., 125 A.D.3d at 92, 998 N.Y.S.2d 543; Mesiti v. Mongiello, 84 A.D.3d 1547, 1549, 924 N.Y.S.2d 175 [3d Dept. 2011]). Further, “when confronted with defendant's motion to dismiss, plaintiff failed to come forth with any facts or circumstances” supporting her allegations (Greschler v. Greschler, 51 N.Y.2d 368, 375, 434 N.Y.S.2d 194, 414 N.E.2d 694 [1980]; see Merrill Lynch Credit Corp. v. Smith, 87 A.D.3d 1391, 1392-1393, 930 N.Y.S.2d 126 [4th Dept. 2011]).

Inasmuch as plaintiff only vaguely contended, in response to the motion, that she learned after the agreement was executed that defendant failed to make disclosure of marital financial information and inasmuch as her complaint contains no facts to support those allegations, the complaint also fails to state a cause of action to rescind the agreement based on unconscionability, fraud, or duress and undue influence (see generally Medical Care of W. N.Y. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 175 A.D.3d 878, 879, 107 N.Y.S.3d 529 [4th Dept. 2019]; Shah v. Mitra, 171 A.D.3d 971, 973, 98 N.Y.S.3d 197 [2d Dept. 2019]; Miller v. Allstate Indem. Co., 132 A.D.3d 1306, 1307, 17 N.Y.S.3d 240 [4th Dept. 2015]). Thus, Supreme Court erred in denying defendant's motion insofar as it sought dismissal of the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7). We therefore reverse the order and dismiss the complaint. We note, however, that the dismissal is without prejudice to an application by plaintiff to Supreme Court for leave to serve an amended complaint (see Leonardi v. County of Cayuga, 103 A.D.3d 1232, 1234, 959 N.Y.S.2d 777 [4th Dept. 2013]; see also Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 66 N.Y.2d 812, 812, 498 N.Y.S.2d 362, 489 N.E.2d 249 [1985]; see generally CPLR 3014, 3016 [b]).

In light of our determination, defendant's remaining contentions are academic (see Shenoy v. Kaleida Health, 162 A.D.3d 1703, 1703, 76 N.Y.S.3d 454 [4th Dept. 2018]).