PEZHMAN v. CHANEL (2018)

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Shlomo Hagler, J.), entered November 22, 2016, which, insofar as appealed from as limited by the briefs, granted defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

The allegedly defamatory statements of defendant law firm and its attorneys were made in the course of the firm's representation of defendant Chanel in a prior action and are therefore protected by the absolute privilege attaching to statements made in the course of, and relating to, judicial proceedings (see Sexter & Warmflash, P.C. v. Margrabe, 38 A.D.3d 163, 171, 828 N.Y.S.2d 315 [1st Dept. 2007], abrogated on other grounds Front, Inc. v. Khalil, 24 N.Y.3d 713, 4 N.Y.S.3d 581, 28 N.E.3d 15 [2015] ).  Because the challenged statements were “pertinent” to the proceeding in which they were made (see Sexter, 38 A.D.3d at 173, 828 N.Y.S.2d 315), they are absolutely privileged.  Nor is this a case like Halperin v. Salvan, 117 A.D.2d 544, 548, 499 N.Y.S.2d 55 (1st Dept 1986), in which “the underlying lawsuit was a sham action brought solely to defame the defendant” (Flomenhaft v. Finkelstein, 127 A.D.3d 634, 638, 8 N.Y.S.3d 161 [1st Dept. 2015], citing e.g. Casa de Meadows Inc. [Cayman Is.] v. Zaman, 76 A.D.3d 917, 920, 908 N.Y.S.2d 628 [1st Dept.2010];  Sexter, 38 A.D.3d at 172 and n. 5, 828 N.Y.S.2d 315).

We have considered plaintiff's remaining arguments and find them unavailing.