PEOPLE v. COFFIE (2021)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously reversed on the law and a new trial is granted on count one of the indictment.

Memorandum: In appeal No. 1, defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of robbery in the first degree (Penal Law § 160.15 [4]). In appeal No. 2, defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of two counts of attempted murder in the second degree (§§ 110.00, 125.25 [1]) and one count of attempted assault in the first degree (§§ 110.00, 120.10 [1]).

In appeal No. 1, we agree with defendant that Supreme Court erred in failing to hold a Huntley hearing before the start of trial. “When [a] motion [to suppress evidence] is made before trial, the trial may not be commenced until determination of the motion” (CPL 710.40 [3]; see People v. Jackson, 221 A.D.2d 964, 964, 634 N.Y.S.2d 327 [4th Dept. 1995], lv denied 87 N.Y.2d 903, 641 N.Y.S.2d 232, 663 N.E.2d 1262 [1995]; People v. Blowe, 130 A.D.2d 668, 670, 515 N.Y.S.2d 812 [2d Dept. 1987]; see also Matter of Green v. DeMarco, 87 A.D.3d 15, 17-18, 925 N.Y.S.2d 762 [4th Dept. 2011]). Here, defendant moved to suppress his statements to the police on the ground that they were involuntarily made (see CPL 710.20 [3]), but the court did not rule on the motion prior to trial and repeatedly refused to conduct a pretrial Huntley hearing, even after the People requested a Huntley hearing at the outset of the trial. Instead, the court granted the People's request for a Huntley hearing over defendant's objection after nine of the ten prosecution witnesses had already testified. Following that hearing, the court found the statements to be voluntary and thus admissible.

The error is not harmless. It is well established that, “unless the proof of the defendant's guilt, without reference to the error, is overwhelming, there is no occasion for consideration of any doctrine of harmless error” (People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 241, 367 N.Y.S.2d 213, 326 N.E.2d 787 [1975]). Here, the evidence was not overwhelming (cf. People v. Horn, 186 A.D.3d 1117, 1121, 129 N.Y.S.3d 604 [4th Dept. 2020], lv denied 36 N.Y.3d 973, 138 N.Y.S.3d 494, 162 N.E.3d 723 [2020]). The central factual question in this case was identity. The evidence of identity was that defendant was apprehended coming out of a building located on the block towards which the culprit had been seen running, he fit the description of the culprit, and he was identified by three eyewitnesses after a showup procedure. On the other hand, defendant did not have in his possession the fruits of the crime or the firearm used in the crime, nor was he dressed like the culprit. Moreover, showup identification procedures are inherently suggestive (see People v. Ortiz, 90 N.Y.2d 533, 537, 664 N.Y.S.2d 243, 686 N.E.2d 1337 [1997]; People v. Miller, 191 A.D.3d 111, 116, 134 N.Y.S.3d 605 [4th Dept. 2020]), and the culprit had been wearing a partial face covering at the time of the crime, which further undermined the reliability of the identifications (see State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208, 266, 27 A.3d 872, 907 [2011]).

Therefore, we reverse the judgment in appeal No. 1 and grant defendant a new trial on count one of the indictment (see Blowe, 130 A.D.2d at 668, 515 N.Y.S.2d 812).

In appeal No. 2, defendant contends that the conviction is based on legally insufficient evidence and that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. We reject those contentions. There is a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences that could lead a rational jury to find the elements of the crimes proved beyond a reasonable doubt (see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 [2007]). Viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crimes as charged to the jury (see id.), we further conclude that the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence (see generally People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 [1987]).

We reject defendant's further contention that the court failed to adequately inquire into his request for new counsel. Where a defendant makes a seemingly serious request for new counsel, the court must make some minimal inquiry to determine whether the claim is meritorious (see People v. Sides, 75 N.Y.2d 822, 825, 552 N.Y.S.2d 555, 551 N.E.2d 1233 [1990]). Where, however, a defendant states only conclusory allegations without providing factual details, he or she fails to make a seemingly serious request, and further inquiry is not required (see People v. Porto, 16 N.Y.3d 93, 100, 917 N.Y.S.2d 74, 942 N.E.2d 283 [2010]; People v. Thompson, 32 A.D.3d 743, 743, 820 N.Y.S.2d 796 [1st Dept. 2006], lv denied 9 N.Y.3d 870, 840 N.Y.S.2d 899, 872 N.E.2d 1205 [2007]). Here, on the day trial was scheduled to begin, defendant stated that defense counsel was “fired” for “[l]ack of communication.” We conclude that no further inquiry by the court was required because that complaint was not a “ ‘serious complaint[ ] about counsel’ ” (Porto, 16 N.Y.3d at 100, 917 N.Y.S.2d 74, 942 N.E.2d 283; see People v. Jones, 149 A.D.3d 1576, 1577, 52 N.Y.S.3d 804 [4th Dept. 2017], lv denied 29 N.Y.3d 1129, 64 N.Y.S.3d 679, 86 N.E.3d 571 [2017]). We note that the court had already presided over the trial that resulted in the judgment on appeal in appeal No. 1 and had the opportunity to observe defense counsel and his interactions with defendant throughout those proceedings.

We agree with defendant, however, that the sentence is unduly harsh and severe, and therefore we modify the judgment in appeal No. 2 as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice by directing that the sentences shall run concurrently with one another. Finally, we note that the certificate of conviction incorrectly reflects that defendant was sentenced to 31/212 to 10 years’ imprisonment on count one of the indictment, and it must therefore be amended to reflect that he was sentenced to 31/313 to 10 years for that conviction (see People v. Correa, 145 A.D.3d 1640, 1641, 44 N.Y.S.3d 834 [4th Dept. 2016]).