PEOPLE v. HOBBS (2020)

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Thomas Farber, J.), rendered September 28, 2015, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of robbery in the first degree, and sentencing him, as a persistent violent felony offender, to a term of 20 years to life;  and judgment, same court (Edward J. McLaughlin, J.), rendered January 11, 2016, convicting defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of attempted robbery in the first degree, and sentencing him, as a persistent violent felony offender, to a concurrent term of 16 years to life, unanimously affirmed.

Defendant's legal sufficiency claim is unpreserved and we decline to review it in the interest of justice.  As an alternative holding, we reject it on the merits.  We also find that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 348–349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 [2007] ).  Viewed as a whole, the testimony supports the jury's conclusion that when defendant pressed an unseen object against the victim while announcing that he had a firearm, the victim believed the object might, in fact, be a firearm (see People v. Howard, 92 A.D.3d 176, 939 N.Y.S.2d 4 [1st Dept. 2012], affd 22 N.Y.3d 388, 981 N.Y.S.2d 310, 4 N.E.3d 320 [2013] ).

The record, including extensive psychiatric examinations and competency proceedings, supports the court's finding that defendant was competent to stand trial (see People v. Phillips, 16 N.Y.3d 510, 516–17, 924 N.Y.S.2d 4, 948 N.E.2d 428 [2011] ).  The psychiatric evidence demonstrated that defendant, who had genuine mental health issues but tended to feign or exaggerate symptoms, understood the proceedings and was able to assist in his defense if he chose to do so.

The record establishes that defendant validly waived his right to be present at trial (see People v. Epps, 37 N.Y.2d 343, 348–50, 372 N.Y.S.2d 606, 334 N.E.2d 566 [1975];  People v. Collins, 29 A.D.3d 434, 815 N.Y.S.2d 80 [1st Dept. 2006] ).  Defendant plainly understood that he had the right to be present, and voluntarily chose not to be produced in court.

The court properly exercised its discretion in denying defense counsel's request to be relieved, made shortly before trial (see People v. Linares, 2 N.Y.3d 507, 780 N.Y.S.2d 529, 813 N.E.2d 609 [2004] ).  Any breakdown in communication was the product of defendant's unjustified hostility to counsel, and did not require reassignment (see e. g. People v. Rodriguez, 144 A.D.3d 498, 40 N.Y.S.3d 429 [1st Dept. 2016], lv denied 28 N.Y.3d 1188, 52 N.Y.S.3d 714, 75 N.E.3d 106 [2017]).

We have considered and rejected defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim (see People v. Benevento, 91 N.Y.2d 708, 713–714, 674 N.Y.S.2d 629, 697 N.E.2d 584 [1998];  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 [1984] ).

In light of our affirmance of defendant's conviction after trial, there is no basis for reversal of his conviction by plea of guilty.