PEOPLE v. ROBINSON (2019)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting her upon a jury verdict of two counts of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25[3]) and one count of arson in the second degree (§ 150.15).  We reject defendant's contention that Supreme Court erred in refusing to suppress statements that she made to fire marshals admitting that she started the subject fire.  Defendant was not in custody when she made her initial statement inasmuch as, under the circumstances here, “a reasonable person innocent of any crime would not have believed that he or she was in custody at that time” (People v. Ellis, 73 A.D.3d 1433, 1434, 903 N.Y.S.2d 615 [4th Dept. 2010], lv denied 15 N.Y.3d 851, 909 N.Y.S.2d 28, 935 N.E.2d 820 [2010]; see generally People v. Yukl, 25 N.Y.2d 585, 589, 307 N.Y.S.2d 857, 256 N.E.2d 172 [1969], cert denied 400 U.S. 851, 91 S.Ct. 78, 27 L.Ed.2d 89 [1970]).  Contrary to defendant's contention, “ ‘[t]he mere fact that the [fire marshals] may have suspected defendant of having [been involved in a crime] prior to questioning [her] ․ does not compel a finding that defendant was in custody’ ” (People v. Clark, 136 A.D.3d 1367, 1368, 25 N.Y.S.3d 485 [4th Dept. 2016], lv denied 27 N.Y.3d 1130, 39 N.Y.S.3d 112, 61 N.E.3d 511 [2016]).  “Because the initial statement was not the product of pre-Miranda custodial interrogation, the post-Miranda [statement] given by defendant cannot be considered the fruit of the poisonous tree” (People v. Flecha, 195 A.D.2d 1052, 1053, 600 N.Y.S.2d 400 [4th Dept. 1993]; see People v. Thomas, 166 A.D.3d 1499, 1500, 87 N.Y.S.3d 431 [4th Dept. 2018], lv denied 32 N.Y.3d 1178, 97 N.Y.S.3d 616, 121 N.E.3d 244 [2019]).  Contrary to defendant's further contention, her statements were not rendered involuntary by any alleged deception inasmuch as there was “no showing that deception on the part of the [fire marshals], if any, ‘was so fundamentally unfair as to deny [her] due process ․ or that a promise or threat was made that could induce a false confession’ ” (People v. Brockway, 35 A.D.3d 1229, 1230, 825 N.Y.S.2d 867 [4th Dept. 2006], quoting People v. Tarsia, 50 N.Y.2d 1, 11, 427 N.Y.S.2d 944, 405 N.E.2d 188 [1980]; see People v. Deitz, 148 A.D.3d 1653, 1654, 50 N.Y.S.3d 726 [4th Dept. 2017], lv denied 29 N.Y.3d 1125, 64 N.Y.S.3d 675, 86 N.E.3d 567 [2017]).

We also reject defendant's challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence.  Contrary to defendant's contention, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People (see People v. Brown, 111 A.D.3d 1385, 1386, 975 N.Y.S.2d 293 [4th Dept. 2013], lv denied 22 N.Y.3d 1155, 984 N.Y.S.2d 638, 7 N.E.3d 1126 [2014]), we conclude that her statements were sufficiently corroborated (see CPL 60.50; People v. Krug, 282 A.D.2d 874, 879, 725 N.Y.S.2d 409 [3d Dept. 2001], lv denied 98 N.Y.2d 652, 745 N.Y.S.2d 511, 772 N.E.2d 614 [2002]; People v. Barrows, 251 A.D.2d 711, 712, 674 N.Y.S.2d 153 [3d Dept. 1998], lv denied 92 N.Y.2d 878, 678 N.Y.S.2d 25, 700 N.E.2d 563 [1998]).  Contrary to defendant's further contention, the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the People (see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932 [1983]), is legally sufficient to establish the requisite logical nexus between the murders and the arson to support the conviction of both counts of murder in the second degree under Penal Law § 125.25(3) (see People v. Henderson, 25 N.Y.3d 534, 541, 14 N.Y.S.3d 770, 35 N.E.3d 840 [2015]).

Contrary to defendant's additional contention, viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crimes as charged to the jury (see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 [2007]), we conclude that a different verdict would have been unreasonable and thus that the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence (see generally People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 [1987]).

Finally, we reject defendant's contention that the period of postrelease supervision imposed by the court for the conviction of arson in the second degree is unduly harsh and severe.