WHEELER v. LINDEN PLAZA PRESERVATION LP (2019)

The motion court should not have dismissed the complaint based on res judicata.  Plaintiff tenant's claims for money damages arising out of torts unrelated to possession of the premises or collection of rent, and involving parties other than just her landlord, could not have been brought as counterclaims in housing court and therefore were not subject to preclusion under the doctrine of res judicata (Rostant v. Swersky, 79 A.D.3d 456, 912 N.Y.S.2d 200 [1st Dept. 2010] ).

The Civil Court Act and article 7 of the RPAPL provide the housing court with limited jurisdiction in summary proceedings, that is:  actions for the recovery of possession of real property under various circumstances, and actions for the collection of rent (New York City Civil Court Act § 204;  RPAPL 711).  To require a party to raise claims outside the housing court's purview solely to preserve them for severance and transfer to another court would be a waste of judicial resources.  What is more, requiring the housing court to hear any manner of claim merely because they arise, however tangentially, out of the same facts as an article 7 proceeding would turn the housing court into a court of general jurisdiction.

Res judicata does not apply to claims, as here, that are not inextricably “intertwined” with the landlord's recovery of possession or collection of rent (Sutton Fifty–Six Co. v. Fridecky, 93 A.D.2d 720, 722, 461 N.Y.S.2d 14 [1st Dept. 1983] ).  Notably, neither the management company nor the security company were or could have been parties to the landlord defendants' summary proceeding against the tenant, and therefore res judicata would not apply to them in any event.

We have considered the parties' remaining contentions and find them unavailing.