PEOPLE v. RYDZEWSKI (2019)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment revoking the sentence of probation imposed upon his conviction, following his plea of guilty, of attempted burglary in the second degree (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 140.25[2] ) and sentencing him to a determinate term of two years of incarceration with three years of postrelease supervision. Defendant had agreed to waive a hearing and admit to violating a condition of his probation in exchange for the sentence that was ultimately imposed.

We reject defendant's contention that Supreme Court failed to exercise its discretion in revoking the sentence of probation based upon defendant's admission that he violated a condition of his probation. “[T]he sentencing decision is a matter committed to the exercise of the court's discretion ․ made only after careful consideration of all facts available at the time of sentencing” (People v. Farrar, 52 N.Y.2d 302, 305, 437 N.Y.S.2d 961, 419 N.E.2d 864 [1981] [emphasis omitted]; see People v. Dowdell, 35 A.D.3d 1278, 1280, 825 N.Y.S.2d 865 [4th Dept. 2006], lv. denied 8 N.Y.3d 921, 834 N.Y.S.2d 512, 866 N.E.2d 458 [2007] ). Based on our review of the entire sentencing transcript, we conclude that the court understood that it had the authority, upon finding that defendant violated a condition of his probation, to “revoke, continue or modify the sentence of probation” (CPL 410.70[5]; see People v. Clause, 167 A.D.3d 1532, 1532–1533, 90 N.Y.S.3d 441 [4th Dept. 2018] ), and the court exercised its discretion in imposing a sentence of incarceration after considering, among other things, “the crime charged, the particular circumstances of the individual before the court and the purpose of a penal sanction, i.e., societal protection, rehabilitation and deterrence” (Farrar, 52 N.Y.2d at 305, 437 N.Y.S.2d 961, 419 N.E.2d 864).

Finally, we reject defendant's contention that the bargained-for sentence is unduly harsh and severe (see People v. Regan, 162 A.D.3d 1414, 1415, 79 N.Y.S.3d 752 [3d Dept. 2018]; People v. Stachnik, 101 A.D.3d 1590, 1593, 956 N.Y.S.2d 777 [4th Dept. 2012], lv denied 20 N.Y.3d 1104, 965 N.Y.S.2d 800, 988 N.E.2d 538 [2013] ).