PEOPLE v. GALARZA (2018)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of manslaughter in the first degree (Penal Law § 125.20[1] ), defendant contends that the evidence is not legally sufficient with respect to the issue of intent, and that it is not legally sufficient to disprove his justification defense beyond a reasonable doubt.  We reject those contentions.  Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People (see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932 [1983] ), we conclude that the evidence is “legally sufficient to disprove defendant's justification defense ․, and to establish that he intended to cause serious physical injury when he stabbed the victim” in the neck and torso with a knife (People v. Williams, 134 A.D.3d 1572, 1573., 23 N.Y.S.3d 780 [4th Dept. 2015] ).  Indeed, we note that the victim was stabbed between 13 and 16 times, and the witnesses agree that defendant was the first person to use a weapon, while the victim was unarmed.  Furthermore, viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crime as charged to the jury (see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 [2007] ), we further conclude that the jury did not fail “to give the evidence the weight it should be accorded when it determined that he intended to cause serious physical injury ․ and when it rejected his justification defense” (People v. Ford, 114 A.D.3d 1273, 1275, 980 N.Y.S.2d 219 [4th Dept. 2014], lv denied 23 N.Y.3d 962, 988 N.Y.S.2d 569, 11 N.E.3d 719 [2014] ), and thus the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence (see generally People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 [1987] ).

We reject defendant's contention that Supreme Court erred in refusing to suppress statements that he made to a police officer while the officer was transporting him, and while the officer was with defendant when he was examined at the hospital.  The evidence at the hearing establishes that those statements were spontaneous, i.e., they were “in no way the product of an interrogation environment, [or] the result of express questioning or its functional equivalent” (People v. Harris, 57 N.Y.2d 335, 342, 456 N.Y.S.2d 694, 442 N.E.2d 1205 [1982], cert denied 460 U.S. 1047, 103 S.Ct. 1448, 75 L.Ed.2d 803 [1983] [internal quotation marks omitted];  see People v. Rivers, 56 N.Y.2d 476, 480, 453 N.Y.S.2d 156, 438 N.E.2d 862 [1982], rearg. denied 57 N.Y.2d 775, 454 N.Y.S.2d 1033, 440 N.E.2d 1343 [1982];  People v. Dawson, 149 A.D.3d 1569, 1570–1571, 52 N.Y.S.3d 797 [4th Dept. 2017], lv denied 29 N.Y.3d 1125, 64 N.Y.S.3d 675, 86 N.E.3d 567 [2017] ).

Finally, the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe.

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: