PEOPLE v. SNELL (2018)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of assault in the third degree (Penal Law § 120.00[1] ) and criminal trespass in the second degree (§ 140.15[1] ).  Contrary to defendant's contention, County Court properly denied his motion to dismiss the indictment on speedy trial grounds (see CPL 30.30).  On appeal, defendant does not dispute that, prior to April 3, 2014, the District Attorney's Office had no knowledge of the charges against defendant set forth in the accusatory instrument, which was filed on September 11, 2013.  “It is axiomatic that the People cannot prepare for a trial of a case they do not know exists” (People v. Smietana, 98 N.Y.2d 336, 342, 746 N.Y.S.2d 678, 774 N.E.2d 743 [2002];  see People v. LaBounty, 104 A.D.2d 202, 205, 482 N.Y.S.2d 652 [4th Dept. 1984] ).  Thus, the court properly determined that the time period from the date on which the accusatory instrument was filed until April 3, 2014 should be excluded from the time within which the People must be ready for trial based on the existence of exceptional circumstances within the meaning of CPL 30.30(4)(g), i.e., the failure of either the police department or the local criminal court to notify the District Attorney's Office of the charges against defendant.  Those were circumstances “beyond the control of the District Attorney's [O]ffice ․ that prevented the prosecution from being ready for trial” (LaBounty, 104 A.D.2d at 204, 482 N.Y.S.2d 652;  see Smietana, 98 N.Y.2d at 341, 746 N.Y.S.2d 678, 774 N.E.2d 743;  People v. Mickewitz, 210 A.D.2d 1004, 1004, 620 N.Y.S.2d 636 [4th Dept. 1994], lv denied 85 N.Y.2d 977, 629 N.Y.S.2d 737, 653 N.E.2d 633 [1995] ).

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: