IN RE: H.V. (2026)

Order of fact-finding, disposition, and commitment (one paper), Family Court, Bronx County (David J. Kaplan, J.), entered on or about December 9, 2024, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, upon a finding of permanent neglect, terminated the father's parental rights to the subject child and transferred care and custody of the child to petitioner agency and the Commissioner for the Administration of Children's Services for the purpose of adoption, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Clear and convincing evidence supports the determination that the agency made diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship between the father and child by, among other things, creating and monitoring an appropriate service plan for the father, scheduling regular visitation, providing the father with Metro Cards so that he could travel to visit the child, and repeatedly supplying the father with referrals for services (see Social Services Law §§ 384–b[7][a], [e][ii], [f][1]-[6], [g][i];  Matter of M.V. [Ramona M.V.], 235 AD3d 420, 420–421 [1st Dept 2025];  Matter of N.S. [M.H.], 228 AD3d 471, 472 [1st Dept 2024];  cf.  Matter of Frankie R. [Juan R.], 5 AD3d 133, 133–134 [1st Dept 2004] ).  The father's incarceration during a portion of the relevant statutory period did not relieve him of his obligation to maintain contact with the agency or engage in available services required by his plan (see Matter of Hailey ZZ. [Ricky ZZ.], 19 NY3d 422, 428–430 [2012] ).

The finding that the father permanently neglected the child is also supported by clear and convincing evidence.  Despite the agency's diligent efforts, the father failed to plan for the child's future during the relevant statutory period because he failed to meaningfully address the problems leading to the child's removal (see Social Services Law §§ 384–b[7][a],[c] ).  Prior to disposition, the father had engaged in almost no portion of his service plan, and he did not begin meaningfully engaging in services until disposition and even then, he participated inconsistently.  Moreover, the father articulated no feasible plan for the child's future, remained unemployed without suitable housing, had six positive toxicology results, and lacked insight into the uncorrected conditions leading to the child's removal (see Matter of Nathaniel T., 67 N.Y.2d 838, 840 [1986] ).  The father also failed to substantially and continuously maintain contact with the child (see Matter of Nelson M.L. [Nilsa L.], 195 AD3d 504, 505 [1st Dept 2021];  Matter of Nehemiah C., 57 AD3d 240, 240 [1st Dept 2008] ), and when he did visit the child, the visits were often marked by parental conflict and limited engagement.

The evidence supports the court's finding that it was in the child's best interests to terminate the father's parental rights and free her for adoption (see Family Court Act §§ 623, 631;  Social Services Law § 384–b[1][b];  Matter of Star Leslie W., 63 N.Y.2d 136, 147–148 [1984] ).  The record reflects that the child was thriving and closely bonded with her pre-adoptive foster family, with whom she had resided nearly her whole life, and that the foster mother wished to adopt her (see Matter of Taaliyah Simone S.D., 28 AD3d 371, 371 [1st Dept 2006] ).

Contrary to the father's argument, a suspended judgment was not warranted under the circumstances here (see Family Court Act § 631[b];  Matter of Raul R. [III] [Raul R.-Cinthia R.], 199 AD3d 594, 595–596 [1st Dept 2021], lv denied 38 NY3d 944 [2022];  Matter of Isiah Steven A. [Anne Elizabeth Pierre L.], 100 AD3d 559, 560 [1st Dept 2012], lv. denied 20 NY3d 859 [2013] ).  The father demonstrated limited progress in obtaining the ability to care for his child indicating that reunification was unlikely within a reasonable time.