ARK448 DOE v. MARYKNOLL DOES (2026)

Jeff Anderson & Associates, P.A., New York (Nahid A. Shaikh of counsel), for appellant.

Wilson, Bave, Conboy, Cozza & Couzens, P.C., White Plains (Claudine Weis of counsel), for respondent.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Alexander M. Tisch, J.), entered November 1, 2024, which granted defendant Maryknoll's motion to dismiss the complaint, unanimously affirmed.

CPLR 214–g, the Child Victims Act, provides in relevant part that “[n]otwithstanding any provision of law which imposes a period of limitation to the contrary ․ every civil claim or cause of action brought against any party alleging intentional or negligent acts or omissions ․ for ․ injury or condition suffered as a result of conduct which would constitute a sexual offense as defined in [Penal Law article 130] committed against a child less than eighteen years of age ․ which is barred as of the effective date of this section because the applicable period of limitation has expired ․ is hereby revived” for a two year period between August 14, 2019 and August 13, 2021.  Plaintiff's action commenced on July 6, 2021, within the appropriate window.

This Court has previously determined that CPLR 214–g was applicable to conduct that occurred outside of New York where the plaintiff in each case was a New York resident (see Ark265 Doe v. Archdiocese of N. Y., 221 AD3d 422 [1st Dept 2023];  Samuel W. v United Synagogue of Conservative Judaism, 219 AD3d 421, 422 [1st Dept 2023] ).

Here, plaintiff was a New Jersey resident allegedly abused in New Jersey.  In Samuel W., we noted that CPLR 214–g was “silent on the subject of territorial application” (219 AD3d at 421) and quoted the Second Department in S.H. v. Diocese of Brooklyn (205 AD3d 180, 186 [2d Dept 2022] ) that the purpose of CPLR 214–g was “to remedy the injustices to survivors of child sexual abuse by extending New York's restrictive statutes of limitations that required most survivors to file civil or criminal charges long before they reported or came to terms with their abuse” (Samuel W., 219 AD3d at 422).

In S.H., the Second Department expressly determined that the legislative history supported a finding that the legislature intended that CPLR 214–g provide relief to New York residents only (205 AD3d at 186–187).  The Second Department noted that pursuant to a settled rule of statutory interpretation, “unless expressly stated otherwise, ‘no legislation is presumed to ․ operate outside the territorial jurisdiction of the state ․ enacting it,’ ” (id. citing Goshen v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 286 A.D.2d 229, 230 [1st Dept 2001], affd 98 N.Y.2d 314 [2002] ).  The Second Department thus held that CPLR 214–g was not available to nonresident plaintiffs where the alleged acts of abuse occurred outside New York” (S.H., 205 AD3d at 182).  The reasoning of the Second Department is persuasive;  limiting the application of CPLR 214–g is consistent with the principles of statutory interpretation and does not diminish the protection provided to New Yorkers.

Plaintiff asserts that her action is timely under New Jersey law.  The New Jersey statute provides that “[n]otwithstanding the statute of limitations ․ or any other statute, an action at law for an injury resulting from the commission of sexual assault, any other crime of a sexual nature, a prohibited sexual action ․ or sexual abuse ․ that occurred prior to the effective date [December 1, 2019], and which action would otherwise be barred through the application of the statute of limitations, may be commenced within two years immediately following the effective date [to December 1, 2021]” (NJ Stat Ann § 2A:14–2b).

However, the revived claims are subject to CPLR 202, the borrowing statute (see Doe v. Wilhelmina Models, Inc., 229 AD3d 128, 132–133 [1st Dept 2024), which provides, in relevant part, that “an action based upon a cause of action accruing without the state cannot be commenced after the expiration of the time limited by the laws of either the state or the place without the state where the cause of action accrued․”  Thus, this action is untimely if it is time barred by either the law of New York or New Jersey (see Global Fin. Corp. v. Triarc Corp., 93 N.Y.2d 525, 528 [1999] ).

We have considered plaintiff's remaining arguments and find them unavailing.