LIVINGSTON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES PETITIONER RESPONDENT v. << (2017)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CHRISTOPHER V.B., AND RENEE E.C.,

RESPONDENTS–APPELLANTS.

FARES A. RUMI, ATTORNEY FOR THE CHILDREN, ROCHESTER.

It is hereby ORDERED that said appeal by respondent Christopher V.B. is unanimously dismissed and the order is affirmed without costs.

Memorandum:  In this permanent neglect proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 6 and Social Services Law § 384–b, respondent parents appeal from an order terminating their parental rights.  Initially, we note that the father's sole contention on appeal is that Family Court erred in denying the mother's request for a suspended judgment.  With respect “to the determination of the mother's parental rights ․ [the father] cannot be considered an aggrieved party, and [thus] his appeal must be dismissed” (Matter of Vivian OO., 33 AD3d 1096, 1096;  see Matter of Charle C.E. [Chiedu E.], 129 AD3d 721, 721–722;  see also Matter of Terrance M. [Terrance M., Sr.], 75 AD3d 1147, 1147).

On her appeal, the mother initially contends that petitioner failed to establish that it had exercised diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parent-child relationship while she was incarcerated, as required by Social Services Law § 384–b (7)(a).  We reject that contention.  “Diligent efforts include reasonable attempts at providing counseling, scheduling regular visitation with the child[ren], providing services to the parent[ ] to overcome problems that prevent the discharge of the child[ren] into [his or her] care, and informing the parent[ ] of [the children's] progress” (Matter of Jessica Lynn W., 244 A.D.2d 900, 900–901;  see § 384–b [7][f] ).  Petitioner is not required, however, to “guarantee that the parent succeed in overcoming his or her predicaments” (Matter of Sheila G., 61 N.Y.2d 368, 385;  see Matter of Jamie M., 63 N.Y.2d 388, 393).  Rather, the parent must “assume a measure of initiative and responsibility” (Jamie M., 63 N.Y.2d at 393).  Here, petitioner established, by the requisite clear and convincing evidence (see § 384–b [3][g][i] ), that it fulfilled its duty to exercise diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the mother's relationships with her children (see generally Matter of Star Leslie W., 63 N.Y.2d 136, 142).  For instance, petitioner established that it arranged visitation between the mother and the subject children, transported the children to those visits, “explored the planning resources suggested by [the mother,] and kept [her] apprised of the child[ren]'s progress” (Matter of “Male C.”, 22 AD3d 250, 250;  see Matter of Davianna L. [David R.], 128 AD3d 1365, 1365, lv denied 25 NY3d 914;  Matter of Mya B. [William B.], 84 AD3d 1727, 1727–1728, lv denied 17 NY3d 707).  Thus, “given the circumstances, [petitioner] provided what services it could” (Matter of Curtis N., 290 A.D.2d 755, 758, lv dismissed 97 N.Y.2d 749).

Contrary to the further contention of the mother, the court properly concluded that she permanently neglected the subject children inasmuch as she “failed substantially and continuously or repeatedly to ․ plan for the future of the child[ren] although ․ able to do so” (Star Leslie W., 63 N.Y.2d at 142;  see Matter of Justin Henry B., 21 AD3d 369, 370).  “ ‘[T]o plan for the future of the child’ shall mean to take such steps as may be necessary to provide an adequate, stable home and parental care for the child” (Social Services Law

§ 384–b [7][c] ). “At a minimum, parents must ‘take steps to correct the conditions that led to the removal of the child[ren] from their home’ “ (Matter of Nathaniel T., 67 N.Y.2d 838, 840;  see Matter of Crystal Q., 173 A.D.2d 912, 913, lv denied 78 N.Y.2d 855).  Here, “there is no evidence that [the mother] had a realistic plan to provide an adequate and stable home for the child[ren]” (Matter of Saiah Isaiah C. [Tanisha C.], 144 AD3d 585, 586;  see Matter of Micah Zyair F.W. [Tiffany L.], 110 AD3d 579, 579).

Finally, we reject the mother's contention that the court erred in denying her request for a suspended judgment.  The court concluded, inter alia, that there was little chance that the mother could continue to control her addictions or gain insight into how her choices were impacting the children, and “ ‘[t]he court's assessment that [the mother] was not likely to change [her] behavior is entitled to great deference’ “ (Matter of Tiara B. [Torrance B.], 70 AD3d 1307, 1308, lv. denied 14 NY3d 709;  see Matter of Jane H. [Susan H.], 85 AD3d 1586, 1587, lv denied 17 NY3d 709;  Matter of Philip D., 266 A.D.2d 909, 909).  Consequently, the court properly determined that “ ‘[f]reeing the child[ren] for adoption provided [them] with prospects for permanency and some sense of the stability [they] deserved, rather than the perpetual limbo caused by unfulfilled hopes of returning to [the mother's] care’ “ (Matter of Roystar T. [Samarian B.], 72 AD3d 1569, 1570, lv. denied 15 NY3d 707).

Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court