Learn About the Law
Get help with your legal needs
FindLaw’s Learn About the Law features thousands of informational articles to help you understand your options. And if you’re ready to hire an attorney, find one in your area who can help.
RICHARD M. BROWN, PLAINTIFF–RESPONDENT, v. JARED PRESTON MILLER AND LYNNETTE F. MILLER, DEFENDANTS–APPELLANTS.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously reversed on the law without costs, the motion is granted, and the complaint is dismissed.
Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for injuries he allegedly sustained when a vehicle that he was operating collided with a vehicle owned by defendant Lynnette F. Miller and operated by defendant Jared Preston Miller. Defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff did not suffer a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102. We agree with defendants that Supreme Court erred in denying the motion.
Defendants met their burden on the motion by submitting the affirmed report of a physician who examined plaintiff and reviewed his prior medical records. The physician concluded that plaintiff sustained only a concussion and a minor cervical and lumbosacral strain in the collision, and that those injuries had resolved. Furthermore, the physician opined that plaintiff's prior imaging studies revealed preexisting degenerative changes not causally related to the collision, and that the collision did not aggravate or exacerbate plaintiff's preexisting degenerative condition (see Bleier v. Mulvey, 126 AD3d 1323, 1324; French v. Symborski, 118 AD3d 1251, 1251, lv denied 24 NY3d 904).
The burden then shifted to plaintiff “to submit competent medical evidence, based on objective findings and diagnostic tests, raising a triable issue of fact” (Applebee v. Beck, 118 AD3d 1279, 1280), and we conclude that plaintiff failed to meet that burden. Although plaintiff submitted expert medical evidence establishing that he sustained injuries causally related to the collision, he failed to raise an issue of fact whether those injuries constituted “serious injury” within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (see Linnane v. Szabo, 111 AD3d 1304, 1305).
Frances E. Cafarell
Clerk of the Court
Thank you for your feedback!
A free source of state and federal court opinions, state laws, and the United States Code. For more information about the legal concepts addressed by these cases and statutes visit FindLaw's Learn About the Law.
Docket No: CA 16–00847
Decided: March 24, 2017
Court: Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.
Search our directory by legal issue
Enter information in one or both fields (Required)
Harness the power of our directory with your own profile. Select the button below to sign up.
Learn more about FindLaw’s newsletters, including our terms of use and privacy policy.
Get help with your legal needs
FindLaw’s Learn About the Law features thousands of informational articles to help you understand your options. And if you’re ready to hire an attorney, find one in your area who can help.
Search our directory by legal issue
Enter information in one or both fields (Required)