KRISTOPHER SPAIN PLAINTIFF APPELLANT v. VICTOR HOLL AND ROBERT SMITH DEFENDANTS RESPONDENTS (2014)
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.
KRISTOPHER SPAIN, PLAINTIFF–APPELLANT, v. VICTOR HOLL AND ROBERT M. SMITH, DEFENDANTS–RESPONDENTS.
Decided: March 28, 2014
PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., FAHEY, LINDLEY, SCONIERS, AND WHALEN, JJ.
ATHARI & ASSOCIATES, LLC, UTICA (MO ATHARI OF COUNSEL), FOR PLAINTIFF–APPELLANT. BOND SCHOENECK & KING, PLLC, SYRACUSE (DANIEL J. PAUTZ OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT–RESPONDENT VICTOR HOLL. WILLIAMSON, CLUNE & STEVENS, ITHACA (PAUL D. SWEENEY OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT–RESPONDENT ROBERT M. SMITH.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
It is hereby ORDERED that the order and judgment so appealed from is unanimously modified on the law by denying the motion of defendant Robert M. Smith and reinstating the complaint against him, and as modified the order and judgment is affirmed without costs.
Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action seeking damages for injuries he allegedly sustained as a result of his exposure to lead paint as a child in two apartments in which he resided. Defendants, the owners of the subject properties, each moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against him, and plaintiff cross-moved for, inter alia, partial summary judgment on the issues of notice and negligence against defendant Robert M. Smith. Plaintiff appeals from an order and judgment granting defendants' motions and denying his cross motion. We conclude that Supreme Court properly denied plaintiff's cross motion and properly granted the motion of defendant Victor Holl and dismissed the complaint against him. In order for a landlord to be held liable for a lead paint condition, it must be established that the landlord had actual or constructive notice of the hazardous condition and a reasonable opportunity to remedy it, but failed to do so (see Stokely v. Wright, 111 AD3d 1382, 1382). We agree that Holl met his initial burden by establishing that he did not have actual or constructive notice of the hazardous lead paint condition, and plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact (see id. at 1382–1383; see generally Chapman v. Silber, 97 N.Y.2d 9, 15). We agree with plaintiff, however, that the court erred in granting the motion of Smith, and we therefore modify the order accordingly. We conclude on the record before us that there are issues of fact whether Smith took reasonable measures to abate the lead paint hazard after he received actual notice thereof and whether plaintiff sustained additional injuries after defendant received such notice (see Pagan v. Rafter, 107 AD3d 1505, 1506–1507).
Frances E. Cafarell
Clerk of the Court
Was this helpful?
Welcome to FindLaw's Cases & Codes
A free source of state and federal court opinions, state laws, and the United States Code. For more information about the legal concepts addressed by these cases and statutes visit FindLaw's Learn About the Law.