IN RE: THOMAS C. and Tristan C. (2011)

 Respondent mother appeals from an order that, inter alia, adjudicated her two children to be neglected by her and provided that her visitation with them must be supervised.   We dismiss the appeal from the order insofar as it concerns visitation inasmuch as that part of the order was entered on the mother's consent, and thus no appeal lies therefrom (see CPLR 5511;  Matter of Gittens v. Chin–On, 19 A.D.3d 596, 796 N.Y.S.2d 554).   We note in any event that the part of the order concerning visitation has since expired, rendering that part of the appeal moot (see Matter of Forsyth v. Avery, 263 A.D.2d 705, 692 N.Y.S.2d 864).   We reject the mother's contention that petitioner failed to meet its burden of establishing that the children were neglected.   Petitioner established by a preponderance of the evidence that the mental or emotional condition of each child had been or was in imminent danger of becoming impaired as the result of the mother's conduct in making false accusations of neglect against the father (see Matter of Kevin M.H., 76 A.D.3d 1015, 908 N.Y.S.2d 109, lv. denied 15 N.Y.3d 715, 2010 WL 5110081 [Dec. 16, 2010] ), and in otherwise involving the children in her antagonistic conduct toward the father (see Matter of Caleb L., 287 A.D.2d 831, 732 N.Y.S.2d 112).   Contrary to the further contention of the mother, we conclude that Family Court neither violated the Family Court Act nor denied her the right to due process when it curtailed her direct and cross-examination of witnesses.   The scope of the examination of witnesses rests within the trial court's sound discretion (see generally Matter of Shane MM. v. Family & Children Servs., 280 A.D.2d 699, 700–701, 720 N.Y.S.2d 219), and we perceive no abuse of that discretion here.

It is hereby ORDERED that said appeal from the order insofar as it concerns visitation is unanimously dismissed and the order is otherwise affirmed without costs.

MEMORANDUM: