PEOPLE v. LANDY (2009)

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Charles H. Solomon, J.), rendered October 22, 2003, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of burglary in the first degree, robbery in the third degree (two counts), attempted robbery in the third degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, and sentencing him, as a persistent violent felony offender, to an aggregate term of 20 years to life, and order, same court and Justice, entered on or about April 16, 2004, which denied defendant's CPL 440.10 motion to vacate the judgment, unanimously affirmed.

 The court properly denied defendant's suppression motion in all respects.   The description of defendant was sufficiently detailed, given the temporal and spatial factors (see e.g. People v. Rampersant, 272 A.D.2d 202, 708 N.Y.S.2d 70 [2000], lv. denied 95 N.Y.2d 870, 715 N.Y.S.2d 225, 738 N.E.2d 373 [2000] ), so as to provide, at the very least, reasonable suspicion warranting an investigatory detention of defendant for prompt identification by the victims (see People v. Hicks, 68 N.Y.2d 234, 238-239, 508 N.Y.S.2d 163, 500 N.E.2d 861 [1986] ).   The manner in which the showup was conducted was not unduly suggestive, given the chain of fast-paced events (see People v. Wilburn, 40 A.D.3d 508, 509, 837 N.Y.S.2d 71 [2007], lv. denied, 9 N.Y.3d 833, 840 N.Y.S.2d 746, 872 N.E.2d 858 [2007];  People v. Williams, 15 A.D.3d 244, 246, 789 N.Y.S.2d 155 [2005], lv. denied, 5 N.Y.3d 771, 801 N.Y.S.2d 266, 834 N.E.2d 1275 [2005] ).   Defendant's statements to the police were spontaneous and not the product of interrogation or its functional equivalent (see People v. Campney, 94 N.Y.2d 307, 314, 704 N.Y.S.2d 916, 726 N.E.2d 468 [1999] ).

 The verdict was based on legally sufficient evidence.   The dangerous instrument element of first-degree burglary under Penal Law § 140.30(3), as well as the force element of robbery, was established by evidence that, during the commission of the crime, defendant possessed a sharp piece of metal capable of causing injury, and that he displayed it in a manner that conveyed a threat to stab the victims if they did not comply with his demand for money (see People v. Carter, 53 N.Y.2d 113, 116, 440 N.Y.S.2d 607, 423 N.E.2d 30 [1981];  People v. Pena, 50 N.Y.2d 400, 407-408, 429 N.Y.S.2d 410, 406 N.E.2d 1347 [1980], cert. denied 449 U.S. 1087, 101 S.Ct. 878, 66 L.Ed.2d 814 [1981] ).

Defendant's claims regarding the prosecutor's conduct in cross-examination and summation, and regarding the sufficiency of the court's jury instructions, are unpreserved and we decline to review them in the interest of justice.   As an alternative holding, we also reject them on the merits.   Defendant's pro se speedy trial claim is without merit.   Defendant's remaining pro se claims are unpreserved or otherwise procedurally defective and we decline to review them in the interest of justice.   As an alternative holding, we also reject them on the merits.