PEOPLE v. MORROW (2009)

On appeal from a judgment convicting her upon her plea of guilty of criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree (Penal Law § 165.45[1] ), defendant contends that County Court erred in refusing to suppress evidence seized from a van in which she was a passenger inasmuch as the police lacked the requisite reasonable suspicion to stop the van.   We reject that contention (see generally People v. Spencer, 84 N.Y.2d 749, 753, 622 N.Y.S.2d 483, 646 N.E.2d 785, cert. denied 516 U.S. 905, 116 S.Ct. 271, 133 L.Ed.2d 192).   The testimony at the suppression hearing established that the van matched the description of the vehicle involved in a larceny, and the van was stopped shortly after the commission of the crime, within a few miles of the scene of the crime.   Under those circumstances, the stop of the van was supported by reasonable suspicion that its occupants had committed the larceny (see People v. Van Every, 1 A.D.3d 977, 978-979, 767 N.Y.S.2d 176, lv. denied 1 N.Y.3d 602, 776 N.Y.S.2d 233, 234, 808 N.E.2d 369, 370;  People v. Hoffman, 283 A.D.2d 928, 928-929, 725 N.Y.S.2d 494, lv. denied 96 N.Y.2d 919, 732 N.Y.S.2d 636, 758 N.E.2d 662;  cf. People v. Taylor, 31 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 817 N.Y.S.2d 816;  People v. Brooks, 266 A.D.2d 864, 697 N.Y.S.2d 804).

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.

MEMORANDUM: