IGLESIAS v. BROWN (2009)

Plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for injuries sustained by her son when a dog bit him.   At the time of the incident, plaintiff's son was at premises owned by Anne Brown and Vincent Brown (defendants) and leased to the two remaining defendants, who owned the dog.   Contrary to defendants' contention, we conclude that Supreme Court properly denied their motion seeking to bifurcate the trial.   Generally, issues of liability and damages in a negligence action are distinct and severable and should be tried separately.   An exception to that general rule arises, however, where the injuries sustained “have ‘an important bearing’ on the issue of liability” (Tate v. Stevens, 275 A.D.2d 1039, 1040, 713 N.Y.S.2d 598, quoting Parmar v. Skinner, 154 A.D.2d 444, 445, 546 N.Y.S.2d 16), and that exception is applicable here.   Contrary to defendants' contention, “the nature, extent and gravity of the injuries sustained [by plaintiff's son] has an important bearing on the issue of liability insofar as it [is] relevant to the jury's assessment of the dog's propensities” (Lynch v. Nacewicz, 126 A.D.2d 708, 709, 511 N.Y.S.2d 121;  see also Hernandez v. Carter & Parr Mobile, 224 A.D.2d 586, 587, 638 N.Y.S.2d 686).

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

MEMORANDUM: