DOE v. EPPEL (2001)

 Supreme Court erred in denying that part of plaintiff's motion seeking leave to amend the complaint to add the proposed first and fourth causes of action.   Those proposed causes of action allege medical malpractice based upon defendant's involvement in a sexual relationship with plaintiff when she was defendant's patient.   The fact that plaintiff filed a complaint of professional misconduct with the Office of Professional Medical Conduct based upon the same conduct does not foreclose her from seeking damages in a civil action (see generally, David v. Biondo, 92 N.Y.2d 318, 321, 323-325, 680 N.Y.S.2d 450, 703 N.E.2d 261).

 The court properly denied that part of plaintiff's motion seeking leave to amend the complaint to add the proposed sixth, seventh and eighth causes of action against defendant's employee, who was not named as a defendant in the original complaint.   Plaintiff failed to establish the applicability of the relation back doctrine with respect to the proposed causes of action against defendant's employee;  she failed to show that the claims against defendant and his employee “arose out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence” (Smith v. Cutson, 188 A.D.2d 1034, 1035, 591 N.Y.S.2d 674, lv. denied 81 N.Y.2d 707, 597 N.Y.S.2d 937, 613 N.E.2d 969) or that she was mistaken with respect to the identity of the employee when the original complaint was filed (see, Ramos v. Cilluffo, 276 A.D.2d 475, 714 N.Y.S.2d 88;  State of New York v. Gruzen Partnership, 239 A.D.2d 735, 736, 657 N.Y.S.2d 830).

We therefore modify the order by granting that part of plaintiff's motion seeking leave to amend the complaint to add the proposed first and fourth causes of action.

Order unanimously modified on the law and as modified affirmed without costs.

MEMORANDUM: