PEOPLE v. HETHINGTON (1999)

 Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him following a jury trial of attempted robbery in the first degree (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 160.15[3] ) and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree (Penal Law § 265.02[1] ).   County Court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress.   A police officer testified at the suppression hearing that he received a dispatch providing a detailed description of a suspect with a knife, and that he stopped defendant, who matched the description, less than a mile from the crime scene and within minutes of the crime.   Under those circumstances, the stop, detention and frisk of defendant were supported by reasonable suspicion (see, People v. Hicks, 68 N.Y.2d 234, 240-242, 508 N.Y.S.2d 163, 500 N.E.2d 861;  People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 223, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375, 352 N.E.2d 562;  People v. Giles, 239 A.D.2d 936, 936-937, 659 N.Y.S.2d 608, lv. denied 90 N.Y.2d 905, 663 N.Y.S.2d 517, 686 N.E.2d 229).   In addition, the showup identification was admissible because defendant was apprehended near the crime scene within minutes of the crime and was viewed within 10 minutes after he was detained (see, People v. Duuvon, 77 N.Y.2d 541, 543, 569 N.Y.S.2d 346, 571 N.E.2d 654;  People v. Riley, 70 N.Y.2d 523, 529, 522 N.Y.S.2d 842, 517 N.E.2d 520).

 The verdict is not against the weight of the evidence (see, People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672).   We reject the contention of defendant that he was denied effective assistance of counsel due to counsel's failure to pursue a psychological defense.   As part of a viable defense strategy, counsel attacked the credibility of the identifying witness, raised the issue whether defendant had the requisite intent and presented alibi witnesses.   Based on the record as a whole, we conclude that defendant received meaningful representation (see, People v. Flores, 84 N.Y.2d 184, 187, 615 N.Y.S.2d 662, 639 N.E.2d 19;  People v. Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d 137, 147, 444 N.Y.S.2d 893, 429 N.E.2d 400).

 Defendant contends that his waiver of immunity was not valid.   We disagree.   The prosecutor provided defendant with an unexecuted written waiver of immunity identical to that in People v. Stewart, 92 N.Y.2d 965, 683 N.Y.S.2d 751, 706 N.E.2d 739.   Defendant signed that waiver in the presence of the Grand Jury and his attorney.   The Grand Jury foreperson then signed the document, acknowledging the written oath.   That procedure fulfilled the requirements of CPL 190.45(2) (see, People v. Stewart, supra).   Finally, the sentence is neither unduly harsh nor severe.

Judgment unanimously affirmed.

MEMORANDUM: