PEOPLE v. BURGOS (1999)

Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Robert Cohen, J.), rendered March 1, 1996, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of murder in the second degree, attempted murder in the second degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and reckless endangerment in the first degree, and sentencing him to concurrent terms of 20 years to life on the murder conviction, 5 to 15 years on the attempted murder conviction, 5 to 15 years on the weapon possession conviction, and 2 1/3 to 7 years on the reckless endangerment conviction, unanimously affirmed.

 Defendant's motion to suppress statements was properly denied.   The People met their burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the statements were knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made (see, People v. Anderson, 42 N.Y.2d 35, 396 N.Y.S.2d 625, 364 N.E.2d 1318;  People v. Roberson, 249 A.D.2d 148, 672 N.Y.S.2d 36, lv. denied 92 N.Y.2d 904, 680 N.Y.S.2d 68, 702 N.E.2d 853).   We see no reason to disturb the hearing court's credibility determinations, which are supported by the record (People v. Prochilo, 41 N.Y.2d 759, 761, 395 N.Y.S.2d 635, 363 N.E.2d 1380).   The police were not required to contact the attorney representing defendant on a pending unrelated matter (People v. Steward, 88 N.Y.2d 496, 502, 646 N.Y.S.2d 974, 670 N.E.2d 214).   Defendant was not in custody on the case in which he was represented (see, People v. Burdo, 91 N.Y.2d 146, 667 N.Y.S.2d 970, 690 N.E.2d 854) and he was never questioned about that case (see, People v. Cohen, 90 N.Y.2d 632, 637–642, 665 N.Y.S.2d 30, 687 N.E.2d 1313).   Since defendant was 18 years old at the time of his arrest, he was not a juvenile and it was not necessary for the police to notify his mother (People v. Diaz, 206 A.D.2d 314, 315, 615 N.Y.S.2d 6).

 The record establishes that defendant received meaningful representation (see, People v. Benevento, 91 N.Y.2d 708, 674 N.Y.S.2d 629, 697 N.E.2d 584).   Defendant's argument on appeal regarding possible arguments that defense counsel could have made on summation merely amounts to a second-guessing of counsel's trial strategy and does not establish ineffectiveness (id.).

 We perceive no abuse of discretion in sentencing.

Defendant's other arguments are without merit.

MEMORANDUM DECISION.