CAPONE v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF LAFAYETTE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT (1999)

 In this CPLR article 78 proceeding transferred to us pursuant to CPLR 7804(g) petitioner challenges a determination by respondent denying her retroactive retirement benefits under Retirement and Social Security Law § 803.   Although the determination was reached after a hearing, the case should not have been transferred because the hearing was not required by law (see, CPLR 7804[g];  7803[4];  Retirement and Social Security Law § 803).   In the interest of judicial economy, however, we nonetheless consider the merits (see, Matter of Moulden v. Coughlin, 210 A.D.2d 997, 621 N.Y.S.2d 250).

 Petitioner met her initial burden by providing “some evidence of [her] entitlement to retroactive eligibility”, i.e., that she did not participate in a procedure that a reasonable person would recognize as an explanation or request requiring a formal decision whether to join a public retirement system (Matter of Scanlan v. Buffalo Pub. School Sys., 90 N.Y.2d 662, 677, 665 N.Y.S.2d 51, 687 N.E.2d 1334).   We conclude, however, that respondent's denial of retroactive membership was not arbitrary or capricious (see, Matter of Scanlan v. Buffalo Pub. School Sys., supra, at 678, 665 N.Y.S.2d 51, 687 N.E.2d 1334).   Before taking time off to raise a family, petitioner was a full-time member of the New York State Teachers' Retirement System (Teachers' Retirement System).   When she returned to work as a school nurse, she received documents concerning membership in the Teachers' Retirement System and the New York State Employees' Retirement System.   As a nurse she was eligible to join a public retirement system other than the Teachers' Retirement System.   Those documents, together with past membership in a public retirement system, would have been viewed by a reasonable person as a request to join a public retirement system upon reemployment.   Thus, respondent had a rational basis for denying retroactive membership (see, Matter of Scanlan v. Buffalo Pub. School Sys., supra, at 680, 665 N.Y.S.2d 51, 687 N.E.2d 1334).

 We reject the further contention that the court abused its discretion in permitting late service of an answer and denying petitioner's motion for a default judgment.   Respondent established a meritorious defense, absence of prejudice to petitioner, and a reasonable excuse for its delay (see, Cleary v. East Syracuse-Minoa Cent. School Dist., 248 A.D.2d 1005, 670 N.Y.S.2d 145).

Determination unanimously confirmed without costs and petition dismissed.

MEMORANDUM: