IN RE: Anthony M. SUPINO (admitted as Anthony Martin Supino) (2005)

Respondent Anthony M. Supino was admitted to the practice of law in the State of New York by the First Judicial Department on March 27, 1989, and is also admitted to the practice of law in the State of New Jersey.

The Departmental Disciplinary Committee now seeks an order, pursuant to 22 NYCRR 603.3, suspending respondent for a period of three months predicated upon similar discipline issued by the Supreme Court of New Jersey or, in the alternative, sanctioning respondent as this Court deems appropriate.   Respondent has not appeared on this motion.

Respondent and his wife were divorced in March 1999, although custody and visitation issues involving their only child remained outstanding.   Respondent, during the course of the protracted and contentious litigation:  had a restraining order obtained against him by his former wife;  filed nine criminal complaints against his former wife, all but one of which were dismissed;  filed at least thirty criminal complaints against seven different police officers who had responded to his former wife's calls involving either the custody dispute or respondent's alleged violations of the restraining order, which complaints were either withdrawn or dismissed;  left several telephone messages with police officers, including a Captain, stating that he would violate the restraining order and knock the Captain on his “butt;” on at least eight occasions, informed various Essex County Judges of his intent to file complaints against them;  and left threatening messages with the Millburn Municipal Court Administrator, accusing her of being an idiot and doctoring evidence.

In June 2003, the District VA Ethics Committee filed a complaint against respondent, charging him with violating various Rules of Professional Misconduct (RPC) by, inter alia, failing to treat with courtesy and consideration all persons involved in the legal process (RPC 3.2), threatening to present criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in a civil matter (RPC 3.4[g] ), engaging in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal (RPC 3.5[c] ) and engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice (RPC 8.4[d] ).

A hearing on the charges was conducted before a DEC Hearing Panel on March 25, 2004, at which time respondent appeared pro se, and by a report dated April 30, 2004, the Hearing Panel found that respondent had violated RPC 3.2, 3.4(g), 3.5(c) and 8.4(d).  The Hearing Panel, considering in mitigation respondent's testimony that he had been diagnosed as having bipolar disorder, coupled with an alcohol problem, recommended he receive an admonition.

The Disciplinary Review Board subsequently heard oral argument on the Hearing Panel's report and, following a de novo review of the record, affirmed the Hearing Panel's findings of fact and conclusions of law but, unlike the Hearing Panel, declined to accord any significant weight to respondent's testimony about his mental condition, as he failed to provide any corroborating medical records. Accordingly, the Disciplinary Review Board recommended that respondent receive a three-month suspension, and by order entered February 24, 2005, the Supreme Court of New Jersey suspended respondent for three months and directed respondent to demonstrate his fitness to practice law, as attested to by a mental health provider, prior to his reinstatement.

 In a proceeding seeking reciprocal discipline pursuant to 22 NYCRR 603.3, respondent is precluded from raising any defenses except:  (1) lack of notice constituting a deprivation of due process;  (2) an infirmity of the proof presented to the foreign jurisdiction;  or (3) that the misconduct for which the attorney was disciplined in the foreign jurisdiction does not constitute misconduct in this State (see Matter of Power, 3 A.D.3d 21, 23, 768 N.Y.S.2d 455 [2003];  Matter of Meaden, 263 A.D.2d, 67, 68, 697 N.Y.S.2d 285 [1999] ).

 In this matter, there is no dispute that respondent was provided with sufficient notice and an opportunity to be heard and, because the findings of misconduct were based on respondent's own testimony, including admissions and documentary evidence, there was no infirmity of proof.   Finally, it is clear that respondent's actions would constitute misconduct in this State (see DR 1-102[A][5][conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice];  DR 7-106[A][threatening criminal prosecution to obtain advantage in a civil matter];  DR 7-106[C][undignified or discourteous conduct degrading to a tribunal];  DR 1-102[A][7][conduct reflecting adversely on an attorney's fitness as a lawyer] ).

 With regard to the appropriate sanction, this Court normally defers to the sanction determination made in the State where the misconduct occurred (see Matter of Power, supra, 3 A.D.3d at 24, 768 N.Y.S.2d 455 [2003];  Matter of Schlem, 308 A.D.2d 220, 222, 763 N.Y.S.2d 558 [2003] ) and, for these reasons, we adopt the three-month suspension imposed upon respondent by the New Jersey Supreme Court, which sanction is in keeping with First Department precedent for similar levels of misconduct (see, e.g., Matter of Delio, 290 A.D.2d 61, 731 N.Y.S.2d 171 [2001];  Matter of Dinhofer, 257 A.D.2d 326, 690 N.Y.S.2d 245 [1999] ).

Accordingly, the petition should be granted and respondent suspended from the practice of law for a period of three months, and until such time as his fitness to practice law is attested to by a mental health provider.

Order filed.

PER CURIAM.

All concur.