PEOPLE v. EAVES (2005)

 On appeal from a judgment convicting him following a jury trial of burglary in the second degree (Penal Law § 140.25[2] ), grand larceny in the fourth degree (§ 155.30[4] ) and petit larceny (§ 155.25), defendant contends that the showup identification procedure was improper because there were no exigent circumstances.   We reject that contention.   The showup identification procedure was reasonable under the circumstances because it was conducted in geographic and temporal proximity to the crime and was not unduly suggestive (see People v. Brisco, 99 N.Y.2d 596, 597, 758 N.Y.S.2d 262, 788 N.E.2d 611;  People v. Ortiz, 90 N.Y.2d 533, 537, 664 N.Y.S.2d 243, 686 N.E.2d 1337).   Also contrary to defendant's contention, County Court's Sandoval ruling does not constitute an abuse of discretion.   Although many of the prior convictions concerning which the court permitted inquiry were remote in time, that “factor ‘becomes less determinative or guiding’ in this case given defendant's [lengthy] history of nearly continuous criminal conduct” (People v. Walts, 267 A.D.2d 617, 619, 699 N.Y.S.2d 767, lv. denied 95 N.Y.2d 859, 714 N.Y.S.2d 10, 736 N.E.2d 871).   Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, as we must (see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932), we conclude that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the conviction (see generally People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672).   Finally, the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe.

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed.

MEMORANDUM: