PEOPLE v. ARNOLD (2008)

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Micki A. Scherer, J. on motion, Edward J. McLaughlin, J. at plea and sentence), rendered August 9, 2005, convicting defendant of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree, and sentencing him, as a second felony offender, to a term of 2 to 4 years, unanimously affirmed.

 The court properly denied defendant's suppression motion, without a hearing, since the allegations in his motion papers, when considered in the context of the detailed information provided by the People as to the basis for his arrest, were insufficiently specific to raise a factual dispute requiring a hearing (compare People v. Long, 36 A.D.3d 132, 135, 824 N.Y.S.2d 249 [2006], affd. 8 N.Y.3d 1014, 839 N.Y.S.2d 441, 870 N.E.2d 680 [2007], with People v. Bryant, 8 N.Y.3d 530, 533-534, 838 N.Y.S.2d 7, 869 N.E.2d 7 [2007] ).

 Defendant did not preserve his claim that he was improperly adjudicated a second felony offender on the basis of a out-of-state conviction for a crime that allegedly lacked equivalency to a New York felony, and we decline to review it in the interest of justice.   Defendant also claims that he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel as a result of his trial attorney's failure to raise this issue.   Under the circumstances of the case, that claim is unreviewable on direct appeal because it involves matters outside the record regarding the relationship, if any, between counsel's plea negotiation strategy and his waiver of any challenge to defendant's second felony offender status (see People v. Rivera, 71 N.Y.2d 705, 709, 530 N.Y.S.2d 52, 525 N.E.2d 698 [1988];  People v. Love, 57 N.Y.2d 998, 457 N.Y.S.2d 238, 443 N.E.2d 486 [1982] ).   On the existing record, to the extent it permits review, we find that defendant received effective assistance under the state and federal standards (see People v. Benevento, 91 N.Y.2d 708, 713-714, 674 N.Y.S.2d 629, 697 N.E.2d 584 [1998];  see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 [1984] ), in that counsel's performance in this regard was within the broad range of reasonable professional competence.