PEOPLE v. PICKETT (2008)

 Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of manslaughter in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.15 [1] ).   Contrary to the contention of defendant, County Court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his plea.  “Trial judges are vested with discretion in deciding plea withdrawal motions because they are best able to determine whether a plea is entered voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently” (People v. Alexander, 97 N.Y.2d 482, 485, 743 N.Y.S.2d 45, 769 N.E.2d 802), and nothing in the record before us calls into question the voluntary, knowing and intelligent nature of defendant's plea.   Contrary to the further contention of defendant, there is no requirement that he personally recite the facts underlying his crime (see People v. Brown, 305 A.D.2d 1068, 1069, 759 N.Y.S.2d 830, lv. denied 100 N.Y.2d 579, 764 N.Y.S.2d 389, 796 N.E.2d 481).   Rather, “it was sufficient that [defendant] provided unequivocal affirmative responses to the court's questions, never made statements negating his guilt and indicated that he was entering the plea because he was, in fact, guilty” (People v. Williams, 35 A.D.3d 971, 972, 825 N.Y.S.2d 322, lv. denied 8 N.Y.3d 928, 834 N.Y.S.2d 519, 866 N.E.2d 465).   Defendant further contends that his attorney erroneously informed him that he could challenge the court's Molineux ruling on appeal, after entering his guilty plea.   That alleged statement by defense counsel “was not placed on the record at the time of the plea [and thus] is not entitled to judicial recognition” (People v. Ramos, 63 N.Y.2d 640, 643, 479 N.Y.S.2d 510, 468 N.E.2d 692).  “As a general rule, ‘[a]bsent a showing that defendant's plea is baseless, the Judge to whom the motion [to withdraw the plea] is addressed must be entitled to rely on the record to ascertain whether any promises, representations, implications and the like were made to the defendant’ and induced his plea of guilty” (id. at 642, 479 N.Y.S.2d 510, 468 N.E.2d 692;  see People v. Frederick, 45 N.Y.2d 520, 525, 410 N.Y.S.2d 555, 382 N.E.2d 1332).   We reject the contention of defendant that defense counsel's erroneous statement constituted ineffective assistance of counsel inasmuch as defendant failed to demonstrate “ ‘that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial’ ” (People v. McDonald, 1 N.Y.3d 109, 115, 769 N.Y.S.2d 781, 802 N.E.2d 131, quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203;  see also People v. Ford, 86 N.Y.2d 397, 404-405, 633 N.Y.S.2d 270, 657 N.E.2d 265).

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.

MEMORANDUM: