PEOPLE v. HALMOND (2008)

 On appeal from a judgment convicting him, following a jury trial, of rape in the first degree (Penal Law § 130.35[1] ) and rape in the second degree (§ 130.30[1] ), defendant contends that Supreme Court erred in refusing to admit evidence that the victim had previously engaged in acts of prostitution.   We reject that contention.   Pursuant to CPL 60.42, i.e., the Rape Shield Law, evidence of a victim's sexual conduct is excluded in sex offense cases unless the evidence falls within a statutory exception.   One exception applies to evidence that proves or tends to prove that the victim has been convicted of prostitution under Penal Law § 230.00 within three years prior to the sex offense that is the subject of the prosecution.   Thus, by its express language, that exception applies only to convictions of prostitution, not to acts of prostitution or to prostitution-related arrests (see CPL 60.42 [2];  People v. Smith, 27 A.D.3d 242, 243, 810 N.Y.S.2d 193, lv. denied 7 N.Y.3d 763, 819 N.Y.S.2d 888, 853 N.E.2d 259;  People v. Dixon, 199 A.D.2d 332, 333, 604 N.Y.S.2d 604, lv. denied 83 N.Y.2d 851, 612 N.Y.S.2d 383, 634 N.E.2d 984), and here, there was no evidence that the victim had been convicted of prostitution.   We reject the further contention of defendant that the court erred in restricting his cross-examination of the victim concerning her prior complaints that she had been raped.   Defendant failed to demonstrate that the prior complaints may have been false or that they were suggestive of a pattern casting doubt on the validity of the instant charges (see People v. Lane, 47 A.D.3d 1125, 1128, 849 N.Y.S.2d 719).

We have examined defendant's remaining contention and conclude that it lacks merit.

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.

MEMORANDUM: