HAIMOVICI v. CASTLE VILLAGE OWNERS CORP (2026)

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Arlene P. Bluth, J.), entered on or about February 4, 2025, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, denied plaintiff's cross-motion to compel unredacted discovery and a deposition of the former counsel of defendant Castle Village Owners Corp. (Cooperative), unanimously affirmed, with costs.  Order, same court and Justice, entered on or about June 4, 2025, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, denied plaintiff's motion to compel the deposition of defendant Andrew Ditton, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

The motion court providently declined to compel defendants to produce unredacted versions of already produced documents.  Defendants established that the redacted material concerned either internal communications among defendants and the Cooperative's manager regarding legal advice provided by nonparty Jeremy Cohen, the Cooperative's former counsel (see Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais [Suisse] S.A., 160 F.R.D. 437, 442 [S.D.N.Y.1995]), or sensitive personal information to protect a witness (see Matter of Afilalo, 139 A.D.3d 175, 180, 33 N.Y.S.3d 154 [1st Dept. 2016]).  The motion court also providently declined to compel the deposition of Cohen, as the record indicates that his deposition is not material and necessary to the action, and the relevant information sought can or has been obtained directly from defendants (see Liberty Petroleum Realty, LLC v. Gulf Oil, L.P., 164 A.D.3d 401, 405–406, 84 N.Y.S.3d 82 [1st Dept. 2018]).

Likewise, the motion court providently declined to compel plaintiff's requested deposition of defendant Andrew Ditton, the Cooperative board's president.  Plaintiff has already conducted significant discovery, including the deposition of defendant Michael Uysal, another member of the board.  Plaintiff was also in possession of the May 2022 notice and the July 2022 resolution, which contained the relevant findings of fact as to his alleged objectionable conduct.  Thus, it is not clear what further information he seeks by deposing Ditton.  Notably, to the extent plaintiff asserts that Uysal's deposition was insufficient, he waited more than a year to demand a deposition of Ditton.

This Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain plaintiff's arguments on appeal as to the motion court's grant of defendants’ motion to quash plaintiff's subpoena on Citibank for emails between defendant Ditton and individual defendants over a period of four years.  The notice of appeal does not refer to or otherwise incorporate that determination (see CPLR 5515[1]).  In any event, the motion court properly found that the notice requirement of CPLR 3101(a)(4) was not satisfied here by simply annexing the amended complaint, which does not mention Ditton (apart from the caption) or Citibank (see Matter of Kapon v. Koch, 23 N.Y.3d 32, 39 n. 3, 988 N.Y.S.2d 559, 11 N.E.3d 709 [2014] [“This is not to say that a pleading will always provide sufficient notice [under CPLR 3101(a)(4)]”];  Olson v. Glencore, Ltd., 70 Misc.3d 1219(A), *6, 2021 WL 800606 [Sup Ct, N.Y. County 2021] [dismissing petition to enforce a subpoena duces tecum because complaint and motions failed to provide nonparty with adequate notice concerning the circumstances or reasons that disclosure is sought]).  The motion court also properly quashed the subpoena as overbroad (see Rodriguez v. Crescent Contr. Corp, 305 A.D.2d 215, 215–216, 758 N.Y.S.2d 803 [1st Dept. 2003]).

We have considered the remaining arguments and find them unavailing.