IN RE: Jeremy BRADDY (2025)

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Arthur F. Engoron, J.), entered September 13, 2024, which denied petitioner's motion for leave to serve a late notice of claim, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying petitioner's motion for leave to serve a late notice of claim approximately 22 days after the 90–day limitations period expired (see General Municipal Law § 50–e[1], [5];  Matter of Newcomb v. Middle Country Cent. School Dist., 28 N.Y.3d 455, 465, 45 N.Y.S.3d 895, 68 N.E.3d 714 [2016];  see also Matter of Richardson v. New York City Hous. Auth., 136 A.D.3d 484, 24 N.Y.S.3d 308 [1st Dept. 2016], lv denied 28 N.Y.3d 905, 2016 WL 6209312 [2016]).  Petitioner did not meet his burden to show a reasonable excuse for his delay in filing a notice of claim against defendant New York City Housing Authority (N.Y.CHA) or that NYCHA had acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting his claim within a reasonable time thereafter (see Matter of Sproule v. New York Convention Ctr. Operating Corp., 180 A.D.3d 496, 497, 120 N.Y.S.3d 5 [1st Dept. 2020]).  Petitioner's argument that he, on two different occasions, mistakenly informed his counsel that his accident occurred a month later than it did, and that his counsel then relied upon such mistaken date and did not serve a notice a claim within the applicable 90–day limitations period, is not a reasonable excuse.

Petitioner also failed to submit any evidence to show that NYCHA acquired actual knowledge of the facts constituting his negligence claim within 90 days of the accident or a reasonable time thereafter.  Petitioner's proposed notice of claim and his affirmation in support of the motion for leave to file a late notice of claim did not set forth facts that demonstrate a connection between his claimed slip-and-fall on a liquid substance in the hallway of NYCHA's residential building and any alleged negligence on the part of NYCHA that would allow NYCHA an opportunity to investigate the claim (see Cassidy v. New York City Tr. Auth., 238 A.D.3d 484, 485, 235 N.Y.S.3d 267 [1st Dept. 2025];  Alexander v. New York City Tr. Auth., 200 A.D.3d 509, 510, 155 N.Y.S.3d 317 [1st Dept. 2021]).  Petitioner acknowledges that the liquid condition was transient, and he offered no facts to suggest that the liquid substance was dirty and remained on the floor for a sufficient period to indicate that NYCHA had notice of the condition and an opportunity to remedy it.  Moreover, petitioner's proposed notice of claim and his affirmation do not identify the specific location where the liquid substance was located.

In view of the foregoing, the issue of whether NYCHA has been substantially prejudiced by the delay need not be reached (see Matter of Gonzalez v. City of New York, 127 A.D.3d 632, 634, 8 N.Y.S.3d 290 [1st Dept. 2015]).