PEOPLE v. BROOKS (2006)

 Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him, upon a jury verdict, of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree (Penal Law § 220.39[1] ).   Contrary to the contention of defendant, the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence (see generally People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672).   Even assuming, arguendo, that Supreme Court erred in admitting the hearsay testimony of two police officers in evidence because that testimony improperly bolstered the undercover officer's identification of defendant, we conclude that the error is harmless (see generally People v. Giles, 239 A.D.2d 936, 937, 659 N.Y.S.2d 608, lv. denied 90 N.Y.2d 905, 663 N.Y.S.2d 517, 686 N.E.2d 229).   The evidence of defendant's guilt is overwhelming, and there is no significant probability that defendant would have been acquitted but for the error (see People v. Ford, 262 A.D.2d 1052, 692 N.Y.S.2d 870, lv. denied 93 N.Y.2d 1044, 697 N.Y.S.2d 876, 720 N.E.2d 96;  People v. Jenkins, 175 A.D.2d 648, 649, 572 N.Y.S.2d 579, lv. denied 78 N.Y.2d 1012, 575 N.Y.S.2d 820, 581 N.E.2d 1066;  see generally People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 241-242, 367 N.Y.S.2d 213, 326 N.E.2d 787).

 Defendant further contends that the court erred in refusing to give an expanded identification charge.   Upon our review of the court's charge, we conclude that it reasonably mirrored the expanded identification charge requested by defendant and “sufficiently apprised the jury that the reasonable doubt standard applied to identification” (People v. Knight, 87 N.Y.2d 873, 874, 638 N.Y.S.2d 938, 662 N.E.2d 256).   Finally, the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe.

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed.

MEMORANDUM: