TRISVAN v. COUNTY OF MONROE (2006)

Plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for injuries sustained by her husband while he was incarcerated in the Monroe County Correctional Facility, and for his subsequent death as a result of such injuries.   Plaintiff initially sued the County of Monroe (County) and its Sheriff but, following the expiration of the statute of limitations, moved for leave to amend the complaint to name three sheriff's deputies as additional defendants.   Supreme Court properly denied the motion on the ground that plaintiff failed to establish that the deputies are united in interest with the County and the Sheriff, and thus plaintiff is not entitled to the benefit of the relation back doctrine (see generally CPLR 203[c];  Buran v. Coupal, 87 N.Y.2d 173, 177-178, 638 N.Y.S.2d 405, 661 N.E.2d 978;  Mondello v. New York Blood Ctr.-Greater N.Y. Blood Program, 80 N.Y.2d 219, 226, 590 N.Y.S.2d 19, 604 N.E.2d 81;  Brock v. Bua, 83 A.D.2d 61, 68-69, 443 N.Y.S.2d 407).   “Because we conclude that the [County and Sheriff] cannot be held vicariously liable for the alleged negligence of the [deputies] ․, we cannot say that the interest [s] of the [parties] ‘in the subject-matter is such that they stand or fall together and that judgment against one will similarly affect the other’ ” (Mondello, 80 N.Y.2d at 226, 590 N.Y.S.2d 19, 604 N.E.2d 81).   With respect to the County, it is well established that “[a] county may not be held responsible for the negligent acts of the Sheriff and his deputies on the theory of respondeat superior, in the absence of a local law assuming such responsibility” (Marashian v. City of Utica, 214 A.D.2d 1034, 1034, 626 N.Y.S.2d 646;  see Smelts v. Meloni [Appeal No. 3], 306 A.D.2d 872, 873, 762 N.Y.S.2d 467, lv. denied 100 N.Y.2d 516, 769 N.Y.S.2d 203, 801 N.E.2d 424;  Sarbou v. Meloni, 234 A.D.2d 991, 651 N.Y.S.2d 827;  see also Barr v. County of Albany, 50 N.Y.2d 247, 255-257, 428 N.Y.S.2d 665, 406 N.E.2d 481), and here there is no such local law (see Smelts, 306 A.D.2d at 873, 762 N.Y.S.2d 467;  Sarbou, 234 A.D.2d at 991, 651 N.Y.S.2d 827;  Davis v. City of Rochester [Appeal No. 2], 138 A.D.2d 945, 526 N.Y.S.2d 409, appeal dismissed 72 N.Y.2d 914, 532 N.Y.S.2d 848, 529 N.E.2d 178).   With respect to the Sheriff, it is also well established that “a Sheriff cannot be held personally liable for the acts or omissions of his deputies while performing criminal justice functions, and that ․ principle precludes vicarious liability for the torts of a deputy” (Barr, 50 N.Y.2d at 257, 428 N.Y.S.2d 665, 406 N.E.2d 481;  see Smelts, 306 A.D.2d at 873-874, 762 N.Y.S.2d 467;  Pulitano v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 193 A.D.2d 1055, 598 N.Y.S.2d 876).   “[G]uarding prisoners” in a county jail is a criminal justice function (Wilson v. Sponable, 81 A.D.2d 1, 4, 439 N.Y.S.2d 549, appeal dismissed 54 N.Y.2d 834).

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed without costs.

MEMORANDUM: