DOLCIMASCOLO v. 701 7TH PROPERTY OWNER LLC (2024)

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Arlene P. Bluth, J.), entered March 13, 2024, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and granted plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on their claims pursuant to Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6), unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiff established his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on his Labor Law § 240(1) claim.  Plaintiff testified that he was injured when struck by a steel beam that was inadvertently caught on a crane hook during hoisting, causing it to slide off the truck where it had been placed.  Defendants’ claim that plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of his accident has no merit.  There is no evidence that plaintiff was ever directed not to be in the area where he was injured, and even if there was, defendants failed to show that they were free of any statutory violations.  Thus, plaintiff's allegedly being in an unauthorized area would have amounted only to comparative negligence, which is not a defense to a Labor Law § 240(1) claim (see Mayorquin v. Carriage House Owner's Corp., 202 A.D.3d 541, 542, 163 N.Y.S.3d 51 [1st Dept. 2022];  Hewitt v. N.Y. 70th St. LLC, 187 A.D.3d 574, 575, 135 N.Y.S.3d 15 [1st Dept. 2020]).  The motion court correctly refused to consider the C–2 and accident reports in that defendants failed to lay a foundation that they were admissible as business records (see Zuluaga v. P.P.C. Const., LLC, 45 A.D.3d 479, 847 N.Y.S.2d 30 [1st Dept. 2007]).  Even if admissible, the accident descriptions therein would not defeat plaintiff's prima facie showing (see DeGidio v. City of New York, 176 A.D.3d 452, 453, 110 N.Y.S.3d 413 [1st Dept. 2019], lv dismissed in part, denied in part 35 N.Y.3d 963, 124 N.Y.S.3d 624, 147 N.E.3d 1161 [2020]).  While the C–3 was signed by plaintiff, its description of the accident was not inconsistent in any relevant aspect and thus not admissible under CPLR 4514.  Nor did the court err in considering plaintiff's expert witness, who averred to over 30 years’ experience in coordinating and supervising rigging operations (see Limmer v. Rosenfeld, 92 A.D.3d 609, 939 N.Y.S.2d 50 [1st Dept. 2012];  see also Melo v. Morm Mgt. Co., 93 A.D.3d 499, 499–500, 940 N.Y.S.2d 83 [1st Dept. 2012]).  Any objections to his qualifications would go to the weight a jury grants to his testimony, not to its admissibility (see Santana v. De Jesus, 110 A.D.3d 561, 562, 973 N.Y.S.2d 604 [1st Dept. 2013], lv denied 22 N.Y.3d 864, 2014 WL 1281942 [2014];  Rubio v. New York City Tr. Auth., 99 A.D.3d 532, 533, 952 N.Y.S.2d 512 [1st Dept. 2012]).

Plaintiff's Labor Law §§ 241(6) and 200 claims are academic in light of the grant of partial summary judgment on his Labor Law § 240(1) claim (see Colon v. New York City Dept. of Educ., 228 A.D.3d 422, 423, 211 N.Y.S.3d 367 [1st Dept. 2024]).

We have considered defendants’ remaining contentions and find them unavailing.