PEOPLE v. HUMPHREY (2024)

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Maxwell Wiley, J., at speedy trial motions;  Kevin McGrath, J., at plea and sentencing), rendered September 7, 2017, convicting defendant of attempted robbery in the second degree, and sentencing him to a term of two years, unanimously affirmed.

Defendant's statutory speedy trial claims are foreclosed by his guilty plea (see People v. O'Brien, 56 N.Y.2d 1009, 453 N.Y.S.2d 638, 439 N.E.2d 354 [1982];  People v. Lara–Medina, 195 A.D.3d 542, 542, 145 N.Y.S.3d 804 [1st Dept. 2021], lv denied 37 N.Y.3d 993, 152 N.Y.S.3d 426, 174 N.E.3d 366 [2021]).  As an alternative holding, we find that defendant's speedy trial motions were properly denied.

Initially, defendant's arguments concerning the periods of delay from October 7 to October 28, 2015 and November 10 to December 7, 2015 are unpreserved (see People v. Beasley, 16 N.Y.3d 289, 292–293, 921 N.Y.S.2d 178, 946 N.E.2d 166 [2011]), and we decline to review them in the interest of justice.  As an alternative holding, we reject them on the merits.  The challenged periods from August 5 to September 16, 2015, November 10 to December 7, 2015, and January 7 to February 25, 2016 were excludable as reasonable time to prepare for hearings and trial after the court's rulings on motions (CPL 30.30[4][a];  People v. Davis, 80 A.D.3d 494, 494–495, 915 N.Y.S.2d 250 [1st Dept. 2011]).  The adjournment from October 7 to October 28, 2015 was excludable, regardless of the People's readiness, as codefendant's counsel was unable to appear as a result of being on trial in another matter (see CPL 30.30[4][d], [f];  People v. Bahadur, 41 A.D.3d 239, 240, 841 N.Y.S.2d 5 [1st Dept. 2007], lv denied 9 N.Y.3d 920, 844 N.Y.S.2d 175, 875 N.E.2d 894 [2007];  People v. David, 253 A.D.2d 642, 646, 679 N.Y.S.2d 354 [1st Dept. 1998], lv denied 92 N.Y.2d 948, 681 N.Y.S.2d 479, 704 N.E.2d 232 [1998]).  The delay from April 18 to June 23, 2016 was properly excluded because, after the People sought to adjourn the matter from April 6 to April 18, defense counsel requested a further adjournment and actively participated in setting the June 23 adjourned date (CPL 30.30[4][b];  People v. Barden, 27 N.Y.3d 550, 555, 36 N.Y.S.3d 80, 55 N.E.3d 1053 [2016]).

We have determined on codefendant's appeal that the 30–day adjournment from February 25 to March 26, 2016 was chargeable to the People (People v. Miller, 222 A.D.3d 599, 599–600, 203 N.Y.S.3d 11 [1st Dept. 2023], lv denied 41 N.Y.3d 1003, 213 N.Y.S.3d 229, 236 N.E.3d 1247 [2024]).  Those additional 30 days of chargeable time raises the total chargeable days to 161, which still falls short of the 184 days necessary to warrant dismissal (CPL 30.30[1][a]).