EUSTACHE v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT OF CITY OF NEW YORK (2024)

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Dakota D. Ramseur, J.), entered September 17, 2021, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, granted defendant Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York a/k/a The New York City Department of Education's (DOE) motion to dismiss to the extent of dismissing plaintiff's claims for vicarious liability for race discrimination and direct liability for race and gender discrimination, and granted defendant Sharon LaFia's motion to dismiss, unanimously modified, on the law, to deny DOE's motion to dismiss, and otherwise affirmed to the extent of dismissing plaintiff's claims for direct liability for race and gender discrimination against defendant Sharon LaFia, without costs.

Applying the lenient notice-pleading standard afforded to discrimination claims (Vig v. New York Hairspray Co., L.P., 67 A.D.3d 140, 145, 885 N.Y.S.2d 74 [1st Dept. 2009]), plaintiff alleged that he was subjected to race discrimination under the New York State Human Rights Law (State HRL) (Executive Law § 296) and New York City Human Rights Law (Administrative Code of City of N.Y. § 8–107).  Plaintiff alleged that defendant LaFia texted him inappropriate messages on multiple occasions, including by explicitly propositioning him to engage with her sexually and by making unwanted physical contact with him (see e.g. Crookendale v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 175 A.D.3d 1132, 107 N.Y.S.3d 282 [1st Dept. 2019];  see also La Porta v. Alacra, Inc., 142 A.D.3d 851, 852, 38 N.Y.S.3d 20 [1st Dept. 2016]).  LaFia's alleged comments about plaintiff's race, in the context of her sexual harassment, signaled her discriminatory views on race in the workplace (Hernandez v. Kaisman, 103 A.D.3d 106, 114–115, 957 N.Y.S.2d 53 [1st Dept. 2012]).  Moreover, the complaint sufficiently alleges facts that impute liability on DOE for failing to take immediate and appropriate corrective action after being notified of LaFia's conduct (see Administrative Code § 8–107[13][b];  see Doe v. Bloomberg, L.P., 36 N.Y.3d 450, 454–455, 143 N.Y.S.3d 286, 167 N.E.3d 454 [2021]).  Plaintiff also sufficiently alleges that, due to his race and/or gender, his sexual harassment complaint was not taken seriously or appropriately investigated by DOE and he was disciplined more harshly than other employees (see Petit v. Department of Educ. of City of N.Y., 177 A.D.3d 402, 403, 113 N.Y.S.3d 30 [1st Dept. 2019]).

The race and gender discrimination claims against LaFia, however, were properly dismissed as plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege that she had any authority over the terms, conditions, or privileges of his employment (Kwong v. City of New York, 204 A.D.3d 442, 446, 167 N.Y.S.3d 9 [1st Dept. 2022], lv dismissed 38 N.Y.3d 1174, 174 N.Y.S.3d 697, 195 N.E.3d 532 [2022]).  The complaint alleges, among other things, that plaintiff took his students to several classrooms during the school day, including LaFia's, and that the school principal and assistant principals took disciplinary actions against him and set his schedule (see Melendez v. New York City Tr. Auth., 204 A.D.3d 542, 167 N.Y.S.3d 74 [1st Dept. 2022]).  Even crediting plaintiff's allegation that LaFia, rather than a student, reported his alleged viewing of inappropriate images in the classroom which led to his suspension, merely reporting such behavior is insufficient to show managerial or supervisory authority.

The Decision and Order of this Court entered herein on November 14, 2023 is hereby recalled and vacated (see M–1185 decided simultaneously herewith).